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Leora F. Eisenstadt*
ABSTRACT

Ever-expanding media coverage, scholarship, and popular
publications discussing the difficulty of combining work and
family suggest that this issue is now the essential locus for
gender debate in the United States. The essence of the debate is
the meaning of equality: whether it carries the same meaning
for women and men, whether biological and sociological
differences should impact the understanding of equality, and
whether law and social policy should reflect or encourage these
differences. Privileged but Equal details the theory of sex
equality that is embodied in Israeli employment law and
contrasts it with the U.S. approach. The Article suggests that
the Israeli system employs an "equality through difference"
model, which approves of special treatment for women in the
form of privileges, options, and exemptions so that women who
maintain primary responsibility for family and home have
greateropportunities to enter and succeed in the workplace. The
Article explores the historicalcircumstances, societal needs, and
culturalpre-dispositionsthat have shared in creatingthe Israeli
conception of sex equality in an effort to determine whether
Israel's approach or any of its parts would be palatable,
appropriate,or vastly unworkable in the United States.
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QUEST FOR CHILDREN (2002).
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uproar in the U.S. media. It described a widespread phenomenon of
professional women who are increasingly waiting to have children
into their late thirties and forties, when it is often biologically too
late. The book stirred much discussion about the professional and
familial choices that women in the United States are making and how
these choices impact society and the personal happiness of individual
women. Many of these women waited to consider having children
because of the toll it would take on their careers or because they had
The
spent their youths focused on education and career. 2
overwhelming response to the book suggested that many women
experienced this problem of mixing career and family. It became
clear that more often than not in the United States, women who
wanted to pursue the feminist ideal of professional parity with their
male counterparts had to forego motherhood at least until they had
3
established themselves as workers.
The discourse that followed this book in classrooms and living
rooms across the country suggests that the combination of women,
work, and family is now the essential locus for gender debate. The
emerging responses will guide the feminist and counter-feminist
movements in the United States. The essence of the debate is on the
meaning of equality-whether the achievement of equality in U.S.
society carries the same meaning for women as it does for men,
whether biological and sociological differences should impact the
understanding of equality, and whether law and social policy should
reflect and even encourage these differences. The answers to these
questions undoubtedly depend on the advocate's notion of U.S. society
and its goals. Should individual happiness (or the pursuit thereof) be
the ultimate determinant of social and legal policy? Or are there

2.

Nancy Gibbs, Making Time for a Baby, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 15, 2002, at

48.
Recently, the situation of professional women in the United States was
3.
raised again in the context of changing the "dilemma" of the women investigated by
Hewlett. David Brooks, the conservative New York Times commentator, wrote an oped column suggesting that U.S. society and perhaps even U.S. law and social policy
should encourage women to focus on getting married and raising children for the first
ten years after they graduate from college. David Brooks, Empty Nests, and Hearts,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A15. Once their children were school-aged, he argued,
women, now near age forty, could re-direct their attention to graduate level education
and professional development and could then work uninterrupted for the next thirty
years. Id. The letters to the editor in response to this column ranged from outright
applause to intense resentment. Some women agreed with Brooks but demanded that
his suggestions be applied equally to men who may want to be primary caretakers of
children as well. See Lotte Bailyn, Letter to the Editor, The Kids-and-Careers
Tightrope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A18. Others simply rejected the notion that
women should focus on a life partner and children when they were young and
immature, while others rejected the notion that a man could tell them anything about
how to live their professional and reproductive lives. See Constance Leisure, Letter to
the Editor, The Kids-and-CareersTightrope, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A18.
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larger societal aims that should take precedence over individual
needs and desires? In answering these questions, it is useful to
remove our U.S. blinders and recognize that numerous countries are
dealing and have dealt with similar questions.
Societies differ in the ways they institutionalise the relationship
between family and work for both women and men. They differ in the
opportunities they provide for both to combine professional and family
careers. They differ in the supports they provide women in their roles
as mothers and homemakers.... These differences among societies are
reflected in public policies regarding both the public and private
spheres. Such policies, in turn, reflect economic and political interests
4
as well as normative ideals regarding gender roles and family life.

In essence, societies differ in the ways in which they define and
conceive of equality, particularly as it pertains to the sexes.
To shed light on the emerging debate of the proper balance of
work and family, this Article will explore Israeli society's approach to
sex equality, comparing Israeli equal employment law to its U.S.
counterpart.
The United States has adopted a formal equality
approach, believing that, for the most part, equality is achieved
through equal treatment. Israel, on the other hand, provides special
treatment for women in the form of mandatory paid maternity leave,
shorter work hours for mothers, optional early retirement for female
workers, and maternal exemptions from the military. This special
treatment is part of an equality-seeking regime; it is an attempt to
equalize a societally unequal situation so that women who maintain
primary responsibility for family and home have greater
opportunities to enter and succeed in the workplace. While this
approach may at first seem repugnant to those schooled in U.S. and
Aristotelian notions of equality, Israel's system allows for women in
large numbers to join the labor force while not delaying marriage and
childbirth. Israeli laws, in effect, provide a statutory encouragement
for combining work and family. But is this equality? This Article
explores the benefits and flaws of the Israeli approach. It seeks to
locate the historical circumstances, societal needs, and cultural
predispositions that have shared in creating the Israeli conception of
sex equality. In the United States, where there is clearly a struggle
to effectively combine work and family roles, the Israeli approach
must be considered to determine whether it or any of its parts would
be palatable, appropriate, or vastly unworkable.
Part II of this Article will provide a brief overview of the varying
theoretical approaches to sex equality, locating Israel's approach
within them. Part III will address the Israeli legislative commitment

4.
Dafna N. Izraeli, Balanced Lives - Pursuing Professional Careers and
Meeting Family Obligations: Israeli Perspectives, in WOMEN IN LAW 141, 141 (Shimon
Shetreet ed., 1998).
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to sex equality in employment and will explore the specifics of the
special treatment approach embodied in that legislation. Part IV will
examine the relevant Israeli case law that deals with sex equality in
employment, identifying the ways in which it mirrors or deviates
from the legislative approach. Part V will briefly review U.S. equal
employment opportunity law, seeking to highlight the differences in
Israel's approach. Finally, Part VI will explore the ways in which
Israeli equal employment law reflects multiple societal priorities and
values. This Part will address the following: Israel's dominant
collectivist ideology that focuses not on the individual's needs but on
those of the community, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the resulting
demographic threat facing the Israeli population, the Jewish legal
system's endorsement of sex difference, and the influence of European
approaches to sex equality.
Nitza Berkovitch, an Israeli sociologist, has noted that "[1]aw can
be conceived as a cultural product .

.

.. [It] embodies and expresses

specific social ideologies through its assumptions about society and its
various members. At the same time, law also plays an active role....
[It] reflects as well as reproduces social structures. '5 This Article will
examine Israeli equal employment law as a means of understanding
different theoretical approaches to equality. It will explore how social
structures and ideologies inform the chosen approach to equality and
the ways in which employment law, in particular, both reflects and
reproduces these social structures.

II. CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY
When discussing sex equality, the conversation typically begins
with reference to the Aristotelian notion that equality entails the
treatment of likes alike and un-likes differently in accordance with
their unlikeness. 6 This definition, as Catherine MacKinnon has
pointed out, served to create the sameness/difference dichotomy that
has become the dominant approach to sex equality and that has
7
occupied most legal debate and scholarship on the subject.

5.
Nitza Berkovitch, Motherhood as a National Mission: The Construction of
Womanhood in the Legal Discourse in Israel, 20 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 605, 607
(1997) (internal citations omitted).
6.

See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE

225 (1989); see also Frances Raday, On Equality - JudicialProfiles, 35 ISR. L. REV. 380,
382 (2001).
7.
See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 220. MacKinnon notes that "[m]ost
scholarship on sex discrimination law concerns which of these paths to sex equality is
preferable in the long run or more appropriate to any particular issue ....
" Id. at 220.
She suggests an alternate approach, claiming that neither sameness nor difference
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The U.S. conception of sex equality and laws that seek to
eradicate sex discrimination are premised on a theory of "sameness,"
in which a woman's relevant similarity to men is the basis on which
she can demand equal treatment. 8 The U.S. approach embodies
theories of formal equality and substantive equality, both of which
are based on the principle of sameness. Formal equality is depicted
in John Stuart Mill's notion that sex equality may be achieved
through commitment to "a principle of perfect equality, admitting no
power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other."9 Such
an approach insists on the removal of barriers to equal achievement
and the eradication of discrimination. Substantive equality added to
this notion the recognition that equal treatment was not sufficient to
achieve equality and that equal opportunity could only be ensured
through prohibition of intentional and unintentional discrimination,
sexual harassment, and hostile work environments. 10 Substantive
equality demanded the creation of a system in which the rights
provided by formal equality could be enforced.11 Under both formal
and substantive equality schemes, U.S. legislation and jurisprudence
have sought to achieve sex equality by identifying ways in which men
12
and women are the same and thus deserving of the same treatment.
The sameness approach suggests that the only relevant differences
are biological, that sex stereotypes should not be given credence as
actual differences, and that the use of even biological differences to
justify differential treatment must be intensely scrutinized to ensure
a relevant connection between the biological characteristic and the
difference in treatment.
While to the law student in the United States it seems obvious
that the principle of sex equality should embody this notion of
sameness, it is by no means the only approach to sex equality. The
other side of the debate focuses, of course, on difference and argues
that providing absolute equal treatment disregards the real
differences in needs, values, and positions of women. 13 It is possible
to situate affirmative action within the difference theory because it
recognizes historical discrimination against women, which then

addresses the real issues of power and hierarchy embodied in the problem of sex
inequality. Id.
8.
See id. at 217.
9.
Sarah E. Burns, Slouching Toward Gender Equality, in WOMEN IN LAW
275, 275 (1998) (quoting JOHN STUART MILL,THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 1 (Susan M.

Okin ed., Hackett Publ'g 1988) (1869)).
10.
See Raday, supra note 6, at 385-86.
11.
See id.
12.
See Burns, supra note 9, at 278.
13.
See WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND EUROPE 3-4 (Mary Buckley & Malcolm
Anderson, eds., 1988). The editors provide a discussion of various approaches to
equality, including the notion that attention must be paid to situational differences.
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requires differences in present treatment to remedy the inequality
that was historically created.
Thus, different treatment under
affirmative action is based not on relevant biological differences, but
on a history of unjustifiable differential treatment. 14 However, while
affirmative action seems to emerge out of a difference theory, it has,
for the most part, been accepted under the sameness approach as a
necessary supplement to formal and substantive equality. 15
What has not been accepted under the U.S. conception of
sameness equality is an approach to equality that expands
recognition of difference beyond both biology and historic
discrimination.
In Israel, the legal system acknowledges both
biological and societal differences. 16 This Article will refer to this
system as "equality through difference." In contrast to the sameness
theory, the equality through difference theory both appreciates and
accommodates differences. 17
Frances Raday, who advocates
accommodation as "the most far-reaching measure of socio-dynamic
equality," insists that the concept of equality should not end with the
bestowal of formal equality or even with the creation of substantive
equal opportunity and affirmative action to remedy past

14.
See Raday, supranote 6, at 387.
15.
See id.
16.
Catherine MacKinnon calls this "situated difference." See MACKINNON,
supra note 6, at 217-23.
17.
See Raday, supra note 6, at 388. The focus of this Article is the Israeli
approach to sex equality in employment law, and it does not deal with any other
aspects of Israeli law. That is a purposeful choice, as Israeli law is not consistent in its
approach to sex equality in all aspects of life. While Israel uses a civil law system for
issues of employment law, criminal law, property, and other matters, all issues of
personal status are dealt with through the religious courts. Berkovitch, supra note 5,
at 607. Israel, upon achieving statehood in 1948, adopted the Ottoman system of law,
which had been practiced by the British in the decades before Israeli statehood. Id.
That system left all matters of personal status law to each religious community. Id.
For Israeli Jews this means that all matters relating to marriage and divorce must be
dealt with in the Rabbinic courts, which apply ancient Jewish law. The result is a
situation of great inequality for women, who are not viewed as independent legal
entities under this system. The situation has led to much criticism, in particular
regarding its approach to divorce. Women are not permitted to initiate a divorce and
must wait until the husband formally consents. Raday, supra note 6, at 391. The
courts cannot force a man to consent, leaving many women permanently chained to
their husbands, a circumstance called Agunah in Hebrew. Id. This situation of
immense inequality, however, pertains only to matters of personal status dealt with in
the Rabbinic courts and is not meant to permeate the civil law courts at all. As a
result, the employment laws are highly focused on achieving equality for women in this
sphere without regard to their positions within the Rabbinic law. The impact on Israeli
society of the Jewish law's approach to women will be discussed in Part VI.D.
However, this Article focuses on equal employment legislation in order to explore
Israel's strong commitment to sex equality in this sphere and to question the ways in
which that commitment differs from the U.S. approach.
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discrimination.1 8 Instead, she argues that "[w]here the differences
between groups are not the result of stereotypes but are genuine
ongoing differences relevant to the function to be performed, then a
society which regards participation in such functions as a social goal,
needs to provide measures of accommodation for those differences."' 19
Thus, the accommodation theory, as advocated by Raday, adopts
Aristotle's notion of treating likes alike and un-likes differently but
differs from a sameness approach in its willingness to consider
biological differences in determining the appropriate treatment of the
sexes. Accommodation must be made to ensure participation in the
system despite biological difference. As this Article will argue, Israeli
legislation has, at times, gone beyond even this definition of
accommodation to embody what the Author terms the "equality
through difference" theory.
Under this theory, even societal
differences between men and women are not ignored but are instead
accommodated by the legal system. For example, the fact that
women are primary caretakers, while not a biologically relevant
difference, is a societal reality in many countries and, under this
equality through difference theory, would be reflected in the laws
applicable to working women.
Societies attempting to achieve sex equality in the workplace and
educational settings must choose between the equality through
sameness and the equality through difference approaches. As may be
expected, both systems have benefits and flaws. With respect to the
sameness approach, Sarah Burns has commented that:
The equality model has much to recommend it . . . . By proposing a

simple comparative test, the equality model provides guidelines to
achieve results that many would otherwise avoid by the
rationalizations used to perpetuate inequality in the first place. At the
same time ... whether through the constraints of the model or abuses
of it, the equality model has been limited in its ability to address
20
underlying patterns of inequality.

Catherine MacKinnon has also noted that the sameness approach
makes the male paradigm the ideal, forcing women to become like
men in order to claim unequal treatment. 21 "The sameness route
ignores the fact that the indices or injuries of sex or sexism often
ensure that simply being a woman may mean seldom being in a

18.
See Raday, supra note 6, at 390. There are numerous explanations for
affirmative action including and going beyond that of remedying past discrimination.
Affirmative action is, however, a "limited measure intended to close gaps," while
"accommodation is a long term measure intended to facilitate participation in spite of
difference." Correspondence with Frances Raday, Professor, Hebrew Univ., Faculty of
Law, in Jerusalem, Isr. (Aug. 31, 2005).
19.
See Raday, supra note 6, at 388.
20.
Burns, supra note 9, at 278-79.
21.
See MAcKINNON, supra note 6, at 225.
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position sufficiently similar to a man's to have unequal treatment
22
attributed to sex bias."
The difference approach too lends itself to both praise and
criticism. It is commended in that it accounts for the reality of
difference between men and women in their societal roles. However,
this approach is often criticized as protectionist and regressive in
that, as MacKinnon notes, it "incorporates and reflects rather than
alters the substance of women's inferior status ....
23 In this way,
the difference approach accounts for the realities of women's
experiences but does nothing to change the unfairness and inequality
that exists deep within the system.
Evaluation of the appropriateness of an equality-seeking regime
is dependent, for the most part, on the goals and mores of the society
in which it is used. Thus, as Izraeli points out, societies concieve of
women's roles and status, as they do with equality overal, according
to societal needs or values. In these differences lies the explanation
for the varying approaches used by the Israeli and U.S. legal systems
to achieving what each considers "sex equality."

III. ISRAELI EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LEGISLATION

A. Israel's ContinuingStatutory Commitment to Sex Equality
Israel has been committed explicitly to the principle of sex
equality from its earliest years. Because Israel's legal system was
initially based in large part on English law, the state came into being
with recognition of women as legal persons who deserve equal
treatment. 24
In fact, the 1948 Declaration of Independence
incorporated this notion of sex equality, asserting that the State of
Israel would "ensure complete equality of social and political rights to
all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race, or sex. '2 5 The fact

22.
23.

Id. at 233.
Id.

24.

Frances Raday, Equality of Women under Israeli Law, 27 JERUSALEM

Q.

81,

81 (1983).
25.
Declaration of Independence cl. 2 (Isr. 1948), cited in Raday, supra note 24,
at 82. Note that while the "equal protection" clause of the U.S. Constitution predates
Israel's Declaration of Independence, it was not thought to include sex until much
later. Israel's assertion of sex equality in 1948 came sixteen years before the United
States passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited discrimination in
employment based on sex, among other categories. Even then, sex was added to the
Civil Rights Act by Senators wishing to derail the Act's passage with what they
considered to be an outlandish amendment. See KATHARINE BARTLETT, ANGELA
HARRIS, AND DEBORAH RHODE, GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY

167 (3d ed. 2002). The Act passed with the addition of sex and became one of the most
important tools used in combating sex discrimination in the United States. Id.
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that this assertion of sex equality appeared in Israel's founding
document suggests Israel's long-standing commitment to the concept.
However, unlike the later laws passed by the Knesset, Israel's
Parliament, the Declaration of Independence has no constitutional
authority, making it impossible to use this assertion of sex equality to
invalidate contemporaneous or future laws and practices that violate
it.
As a result, between the state's founding in 1948 and the
present, the Knesset has passed numerous laws guaranteeing equal
rights to women. 26 The decade between 1950 and 1960 in Israel
brought two important pieces of equality legislation: the Women's
Rights Law of 195127 and the Women's Employment Law of 1954,28
both of which focused on protecting working mothers. In 1964, the
Knesset expanded its commitment to sex equality in employment,
passing the Equal Pay Law, which mandated equal wages between
the sexes for equal work. 29 In the 1980s, this body of legislation was
expanded through amendments and supplemented through new
statutes, often in response to challenges raised in the courts.
In 1981, the National Labor Court heard a case in which an ElAl Airline stewardess challenged the company's policy that prohibited
the promotion of women to the rank of chief steward. 30 The National
Labor Court, in Chazin v. El-Al, held in favor of the woman based on
its power to invalidate provisions in collective bargaining agreements
as contrary to public policy. 31 However, the ruling only affected those
who were already employed because the laws that existed at the time
of the case pertained only to discrimination in working conditions and
not to applicants seeking to be hired. 32 As a result, the Knesset
33
passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Law of 1981,
prohibiting sex discrimination in employment settings and in the
34
acceptance of job applications.
In 1987, the Knesset passed the Equal Retirement Age for Male
and Female Employees Law, in response to Nevo, a case decided one

26.
Raday, supra note 6, at 82. Israel has never asserted the notion of sex
equality in one of its Basic Laws, which act as a developing constitution. Id. However,
in 1992, it passed the Basic Law of Human Dignity and Liberty, which some have
argued may serve as the basis for equality demands as well. Id.
27.
Chok Shivui Zchuyot Halshah [Women's Rights Law], 1951, S.H. 248.
28.
Chok Avodat Nashim [Employment of Women Law], 1954.
Chok Schar Shaveh LaOvedet V'LaOved [Equal Pay Law] 5714-1963/64, 18
29.
LSI 165 (1964) (Isr.).
30.
Chazin v. El-Al, 4 P.D.A. 365 [1972/3].
31.
Id. at 377.
32.
Frances Raday, Women, Work and the Law, in CALLING THE EQUALITY
BLUFF: WOMEN IN ISRAEL 178, 180 (1993).

33.
Chok
Shivyon
Hahizdamnuyot
Opportunities Law], 1981.
34.
Raday, supra note 32, at 180.

Ba'Avodah

[Equal

Employment
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year earlier by the supreme court. 35 The Retirement Age Act
required that male and female workers be permitted to retire at the
same age but granted women the option to retire five years earlier
been forced to
than men. 36 Prior to the law's enactment, women 3had
7
retire five years earlier than their male co-workers.
One year later, the Knesset also passed the 1988 Equal
Employment Opportunity Law, 38 which made it clear that the
prohibition on sex discrimination applied in offers of employment,
conditions of employment, training and professional study, dismissal,
It also added a prohibition on sexual
and severance pay. 3 9
harassment and, by noting that the "posing of irrelevant conditions
may constitute discrimination," allowed, to some extent, for claims of
40
disparate impact discrimination.
In more recent years, these laws, passed between 1951 and 1988,
have been continually amended and revised so as to keep them up to
date with changing societal norms. Thus, while the principle of sex
equality has never been formally asserted in one of Israel's Basic
Laws, which form its developing constitution, 4 1 the various legislative
acts dealing with equality, particularly in employment, have created
a rich statutory scheme prohibiting sex discrimination and
attempting to ensure equal opportunities.
B. Israeli Legislation'sDifference Approach to Sex Equality
The equality through difference approach appears in various
forms in Israel's sex equality legislation. Israel, like the United
States, initially provided women with special protections in the law,
justifying these protections on the basis of women's vulnerability and
special needs resulting from their reproductive capacity and
perceived physical weakness. 42 However, unlike the United States,

35.

Id. at 181; HCJ 104/87 Nevo v. National Labour Court [1990] IsrSC 44(4)

749.
Raday, supra note 32, at 181.
36.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. This law revised the 1981 law of the same name.
39.
Id. at 182.
Id. While this law explicitly included a prohibition on sexual harassment,
40.
it applied only to harassment that was related to economic threats or quid pro quo
harassment and did not discuss the hostile work environment component of sexual
harassment. Id.
41.
While Israel's Declaration of Independence stipulates that a written
constitution would be drawn up and passed, this never came to fruition. GERSHON
SHAFIR & YOAV PELED, BEING ISRAELI: THE DYNAMICS OF MULTIPLE CITIZENSHIP 260

(2002). In 1950, the Knesset voted to postpone the adoption of a formal constitution
and instead allowed for the passage of Basic or Fundamental Laws which would be
viewed as a gradually developing constitution. Id.
See Raday, supra note 32, at 184-85.
42.
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which has eliminated these protections as discriminatory, Israel
maintained protective provisions for women and transformed them
into privileges and exemptions. Israel justified this special treatment
43
based on women's biological characteristics and social roles.
Privileges, such as legally mandated maternity leave, and
exemptions, such as the exemption from army service, while different
in mode, have essentially the same goal and outcome. They seek to
grant special treatment to women in order to equalize a socially
unequal situation and to fulfill a societal need that is served by
gendered social roles. As the following discussion will demonstrate,
Israeli sex equality legislation employs privileges, exemptions, and
options to achieve these goals.
1.

Night Work

The earliest of these privileges can be found in the 1954 Women's
Employment Law, which dealt with multiple aspects of women's
participation in the labor force. 44 When the law was initially enacted,
it contained a provision prohibiting women from being employed at
night. 45 This provision was included because the drafters considered
night work to be particularly harmful to women. The provision was
enacted to protect what was believed to be the weak female
constitution. 46 The law was amended in 1963, 1973, and 1986. The
current version, however, provides not that women may not work at
night, but instead that "[a]n employer may not refuse to hire a
woman only because she, when accepted for work, announces that she
'47
will not agree to work at night due to family reasons.
As it stands now, the provision essentially provides women the
option to reject night work based on the vague phrase "family
reasons" and maintain their jobs despite the employer's need for
someone to work at night. 48 As a result, the employer may be forced

43.
44.
45.

Id.
Chok Avodat Nashim [Women's Employment Law], 1954.
See Employment of Women Law, 1954, H.H., 288.

46.

See id.

47.
Women's Employment Law, 1986, § 2 (C) (Author's translation).
48.
Women's Employment Law, 1986, § 2 (C) 1-9. There is an exception to this
rule for women working in industries that require night work as a component of the job
itself. Id. These industries include: travel or tourism agencies that are in airports,
seaports, or international conferences; state services that are essential to the state;
institutions that care for the sick, elderly, or children; and newspapers, among others.
Id. Additionally, a 1955 amendment to the law indicated that the prohibition (since
extinguished) on night work would not apply to jobs that were in service of the nation,
including those dealing with taxes, meteorology, telephone centers, police force, prison
services, airline services, and travel bureaus. See Amendment to Women's Employment
Law Regarding Night Work in Service of the Nation, 1955. The amendment included
conditions on night work, in service of the nation, including requirements that women
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to hire additional employees to work those night shifts that the
woman rejects. The female worker may invoke this privilege as
needed according to the burdens of her familial role. As is clear from
the legislation, this privilege is provided to women alone. Male
workers may refuse to work at night due to family issues but will not
be ensured their job security should they make this claim. An
employer appears to have every right to reject a male job applicant
who announces his refusal to work at night even if he bases this
refusal on "family reasons."
While the law itself offers little insight into the reasoning behind
this female-only privilege, the legislative history provides an
explanation that is based on the family centric position of women in
Israeli society. Knesset member Ora Namir, in presenting the 1986
Amendment to the law that changed the prohibition on night work
into an option to refuse it, explained the committee's fear that
because of a worsening economic situation in the country, if the law
eliminated the prohibition altogether, employers would automatically
demand night work. 49 "And if a woman did not want to, she would
not get work. This phenomenon is severe and is likely to harm a
woman's equal opportunity to work." 50
The committee was concerned about the implications of
permitting women to work at night despite the fact that the reality of
their familial obligations had not changed. They believed that if
employers could demand that women work at night, women would be
forced, because of their obligations to children and home, to
affirmatively and without protection of the law, refuse to work at
night. Women would thereby be placed at a grave disadvantage when
competing in the job market with men. Thus, Namir suggested the
privilege to refuse night work that was granted to women in this
provision was an attempt to create equal opportunity for women who
were otherwise in an unequal position because of their social roles as
primary caretakers of the home and family. 5 1 It was not biological
differences in the form of weaker constitutions or childbirth that
prompted this provision, but rather the societal reality of gender roles
in relation to the home and family. 52 This provision perfectly

be provided appropriate places to rest, hot drinks, means of transportation to and from
work and specific rest periods between days of work. See id. As will be discussed infra
in Part VI, the notion of communal needs has always maintained a strong presence and
influence on Israeli law, in this case working as an exception to protective legislation
for women.
49.
D.K. (1986) 2463 (discussing an amendment to the 1954 Women's
Employment Law).
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Id. In explaining the reason for vesting power in the Minister of Labor to
establish conditions for employing a woman at night, Namir indicated that "the
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embodies the "equality through difference" approach. The Israeli law,
by privileging female workers, attempts to equalize an unequal
playing field in which women's family and home obligations would
otherwise disadvantage them in a competitive labor market.
2. Maternity Leave
The 1954 Women's Employment Law also contained provisions
for maternity leave, which is arguably one of the most important
aspects of the accommodation approach. The original law mandated
twelve weeks of maternity leave for women workers, prohibited
employers from employing new mothers during this period, and
mandated monetary fines and potential imprisonment as penalties
for violating this prohibition. 53 This provision of the 1954 law was
amended in 1973, 1986, five times in the 1990s, 2002, and most
recently in 2003. 54 However, the basic notion of a mandatory twelveweek maternity leave has been maintained throughout the law's
history.
The most recent version of the law requires the employer to
grant and the new mother to take a total of twelve weeks of leave, of
which six weeks or less may be used, according to the needs of the
worker, prior to delivery while the remainder must be taken after
delivery. 55 Additionally, a female worker who has fallen ill or been
hospitalized during the period of her maternity leave is entitled to an
extension of the maternity leave for a period that is not longer than
the hospitalization and not more than four weeks total. 56 The
maternity leave may further be increased if the worker has had more
than one baby, increasing the period of maternity leave by two weeks
for each additional baby delivered; however, it may not be extended,
57
in total, beyond sixteen weeks.
This maternity leave provision, while obligating both employer
and female worker, also mandates payment to the female worker
from the National Insurance Fund. 58 According to the National
Insurance Law of 1968, a woman on mandatory maternity leave is
compensated not by the employer but by the government so that the
employer's obligation is merely to refuse to employ the worker during
this period and to continue to pay into her pension and other

committee admits that employment of women at night engenders concern over their
health and safety." Id. However, this was by no means the driving force behind the
creation of the option to refuse night work. Id.
53.
Women's Employment Law § 6.
54.
Id.
55.
Id. § 6(A)-(B).
56.
Id. § 6B(1).
57.
Id. § 6C.
58.
Id.
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professional funds as if she were continuing to work. 59 Moreover, the
law specifies that absence from work for maternity leave shall not
60
harm the worker's seniority rights, further enhancing the privilege.
In addition to mandating maternity leave, the law also ensures
the female worker's position while she is on leave and includes
provisions prohibiting termination before, during, or as a result of her
pregnancy. 61 According to the law, an employer may not fire a female
worker while she is pregnant and before she has taken leave without
express permission of the Minister of Labor, who will not permit such
62
a termination if it is, in his opinion, connected to her pregnancy.
Additionally, a woman may not be fired during her maternity leave or
63
during the forty-five days after the maternity leave is complete.
The law also indicates that female workers, upon reaching their fifth
64
month of pregnancy, must inform their employers of their condition.
At that point, the employer may not employ her during overtime and
weekends. 65 Finally, the penalties against an employer for employing
a woman during this mandatory maternity leave period have been
maintained in the current version of the law and include both
66
monetary fines and potential imprisonment.
In addition to maternity leave, a woman who has worked for the
same employer for at least a year prior to childbirth may take unpaid
leave after her twelve weeks of mandatory paid leave. The number of
months of unpaid leave must equal one fourth of the number of
months that she had previously worked for the same employer, with a
maximum of twelve months. 67 While this leave is unpaid, it is
similar to the mandatory paid leave period in that the woman worker
is guaranteed a return to her prior position at the end of her leave
and is guaranteed that her seniority rights will not be affected. 68 The
law also mandates that a nursing woman be permitted to be absent
from work for an hour each day, and this time may not be deducted
69
from her pay.

59.
Id. § 6G(1).
60.
Id. § 61.
61.
Id. § 9(1).
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. However, despite this prohibition, a woman who agrees in writing to be
employed on weekends and for overtime may only be employed if she also has a
gynecologist's permission that details the conditions under which she can continue to
work. Id. § 10(1).
66.
Id. § 14.
67.
Id. § 7(d)(1).
68.
Id. § 7(d)(2).
69.
Id. § 7(c)(3).
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A recent amendment to this law made the leave policy somewhat
applicable to new fathers as well. While the leave is not mandatory
for male workers, a man whose wife had a baby may take paternity
leave from the six week portion of leave occurring after the delivery if
his wife agrees in writing to forego a portion of it and she is working
during the period that the man is on leave.7 0 Thus, the legislation
created an optional paternity leave to be taken only if the mother has
71
agreed to share part of the leave that is, by law, her right.
In the same vein, both male and female workers are given the
right to be absent from work when undergoing fertility treatments.
According to a 1990 Amendment to the Women's Employment Law,
female workers may be absent for a total of four fertility treatments
in a year. 72 For each treatment, she may be absent from work for
sixteen days if the workplace operates on a five day per week
schedule, or twenty days if the workplace operates on a six day per
week schedule. 73 Thus, at maximum, a woman may be absent for
eighty days in a year to undergo fertility treatments. While male
workers also have this privilege, it is greatly reduced with a
74
maximum of twelve days of leave in a year.
As is surely clear by now, the "equality through difference"
approach is most stark in the Israeli legislation's treatment of
pregnancy. For female workers, maternity leave is mandatory and
paid by the government, and employment during this period subjects
the employer to potential fines and imprisonment. Additionally, the
law ensures that women workers can maintain their jobs while
taking this leave from work. While the law provides male workers
with some rights to paternity leave, it is certainly not mandatory and,
for the most part, is dependent on the mother's willingness to forego
part of her leave so that he may take a leave period as well. This
legislation seeks to both encourage reproduction 75 and ensure
women's ability to maintain their jobs and return to the workplace
upon completion of maternity leave. By making the leave mandatory,
the government has sought to prevent employers from pressuring
female workers not to take leave and prevent discrimination against
those workers who do. The law essentially seeks to equalize the
unequal playing field created by reproductive biology that affects the
ways in which male and female workers structure their working lives.

70.
Id. § 6(h)(1).
71.
Id. § 6H(1).
72.
Amendment to Women's Employment Law - Absence due to Fertility
Treatments, 1990, § 2.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
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Prohibited, Limited, and Dangerous Work

The Women's Employment Law also contains prohibitions on
types of employment for women "of fertile age." In 2001, the Knesset
amended the Women's Employment Law to create conditions on the
employment of women under the age of forty-five, which the law
defines as "fertile age."' 76 The amendment initially specifies that
employers at educational and medical institutions must inform
fertile-age female employees about the risks of contracting rubella,
fetus, and the locations
the dangers it poses to the development of the
77
for provision of vaccination for this disease.
The amendment then addresses work that is prohibited to
women of fertile age, including work in places that produce specific
chemicals or where such chemicals exist in the air in sufficient
quantity as to be detrimental to fertility. 78 A female worker who
discovers that she is pregnant and who works in such an environment
must inform her employer that she is pregnant within ten days of
finding out the information herself. 79 Such a worker will then be
prohibited from working with specific chemicals or in an environment
in which she will be exposed to them.8 0 If the employer cannot find
alternative appropriate work for the female employee during the
period of her pregnancy, she will go on leave and 8receive payments
from the National Insurance Fund during this time. 1
The prohibition on employing fertile age or pregnant women in
such environments is particularly illustrative of the difference
approach to equality embodied in the Israeli law. In this instance,
the exemption of fertile women from employment is directly tied to
their reproductive capacity and is intended to protect both an actual
fetus and the potential to become pregnant that a woman under fortyfive may endanger in such a workplace. However, despite similar
dangers to male fertility, there is no comparable provision to protect
fertile age men who may work in such environments. The exemption
of women, while potentially placing them at a disadvantage in
acquiring certain types of employment, is not seen as violative of the
basic principle of sex equality.8 2 As will be discussed in Part VI of

76.
Amendment to Women's Employment Law - Prohibited, Limited, and
Dangerous Work, 2001, § 1.
77.
Id. § 2.
Id. § 3.
78.
79.
Id. § 4. The same is true for a female worker who is nursing and works in
such an environment. Id.
80.
Id. 5.
Id. 6.
81.
82.
In terms of comparison, it is important to note that the U.S. Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected such a fetal protection policy instituted by a private employer.
See U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 221 (1991). The Court held that such
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this Article, the societal value placed on demographic growth has
likely contributed to a view of sex equality that allows for different
treatment of fertile age women in potentially dangerous workplaces.
4.

Retirement Age

The Israeli workforce is dominated by labor unions, and working
relationships are often defined through collective bargaining
agreements, which establish benefits, promotions, and mandatory
retirement ages.8 3 The mandatory retirement age provision, it is
argued, ensures constant introduction of new and motivated workers,
while likewise ensuring monetary support for the older worker who
84
has already contributed his most productive years of work.
However, prior to the 1980s numerous collective bargaining
agreements dealt differently with male and female workers, imposing
a retirement age on men that was five years later than that imposed
on women. 85 Generally, the agreements mandated that men would
86
retire at sixty-five while women were forced to retire by age sixty.
While some women saw this as a benefit in that they could retire
earlier, pursue other interests, and receive economic support from the
government, others resented the fact that these agreements cut short
their professional or working lives simply because they were
women.8 7 Additionally, in forcing an earlier retirement age on
women, these agreements effectively reduced the amount of money a
working woman was able to earn in her lifetime, perhaps under the
assumption that she was being cared for by a man who could continue
88
to work and support his family for an additional five years.
In 1987, Dr. Naomi Nevo, an Israeli sociologist, filed suit
challenging these early retirement provisions in her collective

policies were prohibited as discriminatory under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
noting "decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to parents who
conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to employers who hire those
parents." Id. at 189.
83.

See MICHAEL SHALEV, LABOUR AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY IN ISRAEL 24-

26 (1992). The Histadrut, the General Organization of Workers in the Land of Israel,
is Israel's largest union and is thus one of the most important organizations in the
country. Id. at 23. "As a trade union, the Histadrut claims some three-quarters of all
wage-earners as members and represents even more (about 85 per cent) in negotiating
collective agreements, which are often legally binding on the entire relevant labour
force." Id. at 23-24.
84.
See Nevo, IsrSC 44(4) at 756 (discussing possible benefits of mandatory
retirement age).
85.
See Interview with Frances Raday, Professor, Hebrew Univ., Faculty of
Law, in Jerusalem, Isr. (May 9, 2004).
See id.
86.
87.
See id.
88.
See id.
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bargaining agreement and claiming that the provision constituted sex
discrimination. 89 While her case was dismissed at the regional level
and by the National Labor Court, Dr. Nevo ultimately brought her
case to the Israeli Supreme Court in 1990, which found in her favor. 90
However, prior to the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court, the
Knesset, in response to this developing case, passed the Equal
Retirement Age for Male and Female Workers Law in 1987.91 The
law mandated that
where, in a collective agreement, a retirement age for women is set
lower than for men, the woman will have a right, despite what is said in
the collective agreement, to retire from her work at any age between
92
her set out retirement age and that set out for the male worker.

Thus, women workers were permitted to retire any time between age
sixty and sixty-five, while their male counterparts could retire only at
age sixty-five. The law equalized the situation to some extent in
granting women the right to work as many years as their male
counterparts but maintained a clear privilege for women. Unlike
their male colleagues, women who worked under certain collective
agreements could now choose either to retire earlier and receive
benefits or to continue working an additional five years and then
retire.
Knesset Member, Ora Namir, the head of the Committee on
Labor and Welfare, explained the reasoning behind the statute
during legislative debate. She noted the particular harm to women
under the old system in that a woman, who must leave the work cycle
to have and raise children numerous times throughout her career,
was already prevented from working for the maximum amount of
time she was able and from earning the salary increases and
promotions that come with devotion to work and increasing
experience. 93 "And here, just as they reach the age when their

89.
Nevo v. The Jewish Agency, 18 P.D.A. 197 (1986); see Raday, supra note 32,
at 181-82. Claims that early retirement constituted sex discrimination began before
Dr. Nevo's case, when two professors at Hadassah Hospital brought suit in 1983. See
Raday, supra note 32, at 181. When their case stalled in the courts, they, with their
counsel, Frances Raday, turned for assistance to the Hadassah Women's Organization
in the United States, which put pressure on the Israeli hospital to draft a new
collective agreement with equal retirement ages for men and women. Id. Because this
case was not won in the courts and therefore did not set any precedent, the issue was
ripe for re-litigation in 1987 with Dr. Nevo's claim. See also FRANCES RADAY, The
IsraeliPerspective on Gender, Labor, and the Family, in THE STATUS OF WOMEN AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY - PROCEEDINGS 113 (2001) (discussing comparable

early retirement claims).
90.
Nevo, IsrSC 44(4) at 786.
Equal Retirement Age for Male and Female Workers Law, 1987.
91.
92.
Id. § 2.
93.
DK (1987) 2167.
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children are grown and the woman is available more to devote herself
to her work, she is prevented from doing so by the early retirement
age."' 4 The law intended to correct this inequity by permitting the
woman to work as long as the man. Namir, however, also sought to
justify the female only option to retire earlier, which, she
acknowledged, provided special treatment for women rather than
absolute equality:
I admit that this stands in contradiction to absolute equality between a
woman and a man, but still the women are those who get pregnant,
those who give birth; they are those who raise the children from a
young age on their own. We must grant them much more than
95
equality-so that they can get to real equality.

The optional retirement age for women was instituted to both ensure
equal opportunity for women who wanted to work as long as their
male colleagues and to provide women with the privilege of opting out
of later retirement in order to compensate them for the unequal
contribution they had made to the creation of children and family.
In this way, the Equal Retirement Age for Male and Female
Workers Law is the consummate example of Israel's equality through
difference approach. In maintaining this privilege for women, the
Israeli legislation acknowledges both biological differences in
reproduction and societal differences in family care-taking, allowing
Special or
both types of gender difference to inform the law.
asymmetrical treatment of women is justified as necessary in order to
achieve real equality in a society where equality through sameness
96
would ignore actual differences in gender roles.
5.

Exemption from Military

Like numerous countries, military service in Israel is obligatory
for a number of years.9 7 At the age of eighteen, a large percentage of
Israelis are drafted into the military for a period of time before

94.
Id. (discussing the Equal Retirement Age for Men and Women Law).
95.
Id.
What is not discussed in the legislative debates surrounding this law is the
96.
potential that the law will create incentives to hire male workers over female workers.
If a woman age fifty-nine is competing with a man of the same age for a position, the
employer might well be advised to hire the man, who will not be able to retire for
another six years. The female worker, on the other hand, may retire any time between
sixty and sixty-five, making her a far greater economic risk. This, of course, is the
traditional argument against special treatment of women-it both creates incentives to
discriminate against women and further entrenches stereotypes of women as less
productive and less valuable workers.
97.
Defense Service Law, 5746-1986, 40 LSI 144 (1986) (Isr.).
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entering the workforce or pursuing higher education. 98
Many
establish contacts or networks in the army that lead to jobs and
careers. Some remain in the army after their mandatory service is
completed so that the military will pay for their university studies in
exchange for their return to service after acquiring advanced skills. 99
As a result, military service has taken on enormous importance in the
professional lives of Israeli citizens who essentially begin their
careers in the military institution. 10 0
A unique aspect of military service in Israel is that it is
mandated for both men and women, albeit in different ways.10 1 This
sex neutral military obligation has led numerous outside observers to
imagine that sex parity and formal equality are the norm in all of
Israeli society. These observers assume that if there is equality in
military participation, a traditionally patriarchal sphere, it must be
the case in society at large as well. However, upon closer look it is
clear that formal equality is not the goal or the norm in the Israeli
military. 10 2 There has been much focus in recent years on the position
of women in the Israeli military. This has led to considerable progress
in the job opportunities available to women and in their treatment by
higher-level officers. 10 3 Despite these changes, however, there remain
essential differences in the demands made upon male and female
citizens in the statute that creates mandatory military service.
The Defense Service Law was passed in 1949.104 In its original
form, the law defined men of military age to include those males
between the ages of eighteen and forty-nine, while defining military10 5
age women as females between eighteen and thirty-four yeas old.
The law mandated conscription of men for a period of twenty-four
months and women for a term of only twelve months, and it exempted

98.
See Guy I. Seidman & Eyal A. Nun, Women, the Military, and the Court:
Israel at 2001, 11 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 91, 95-97 (2001) (discussing Israeli
Defense Force recruitment practices).
99.
Id. at 99 (discussing post-conscription activities of Israeli soldiers).
100.
See Orna Sasson Levy, Constructing Identities at the Margins:
Masculinitiesand Citizenship in the IsraeliArmy, 43 SOC. Q. 357, 376-77 (2002).
101.
Defense Service Law, 40 LSI 144.
102.
Much has been written about the lack of actual equality among male and
female soldiers in the Israeli military, the positions they receive in the army, their
treatment by higher-level officers, and the prevalence of sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Tzili Mor, Law as a Tool for a Sexual Revolution: Israel's Prevention of Sexual
Harassment Law -1998, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 291, 294 (2001); Seidman & Nun,

supra note 98, at 95-97. Because the focus of this Article is on the legislative approach
to sex equality, it focuses not on the position of women in the military, but instead on
the legislation that makes different demands on male and female citizens entering the
Israeli Defense Forces.
103.
See Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 94 (discussing recently improved
conditions for women in the Israeli Defense Forces).
104.
Defense Service Law, 5709-1949, 3 LSI 112, 112 (1949) (Isr.).
105.
Id.

378

VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL, 40.'357

from regular conscription women who were married, mothers,
pregnant, or who declared that reasons of conscience or religious
conviction precluded their service.' 0 6 Since its inception, the statute
has undergone numerous amendments affecting the term of service,
the ages of conscription, reserve duty requirements, and
exemptions. 0 7v However, despite the many changes, the statute has
maintained its different demands on male and female citizens. In
terms of the time period of conscription, the current law requires
male Israelis to serve a period of three years, while female Israelis
must serve only two years in an entry-level position. 10 8 More
importantly for this Article, however, is the enduring provision
exempting married women, mothers, and pregnant women, an
exemption that has no parallel for male citizens. 10 9
The legislative debates surrounding the initial passage of the
Defense Service Law in 1949 shed some light on the exemption of
married women and those who are or would soon be mothers. It is
important to note that "the exemption of married women and mothers
was practically a non-issue throughout the long debates." 110 The
issue was raised in only five out of the forty-five speeches given on
the Defense Service Law, suggesting that all were clearly in
agreement that married women and mothers should be granted this
privilege."'
David Ben-Gurion, who at the time served as both the Prime
Minister and Minister of Defense, commented that a married woman
should be granted the opportunity to stay at home and "be happy
with her husband" and that "there is no destiny that is more
important than motherhood."1' 12 A more telling comment came from a
member of the secular Labor party who declared that "[h]e who
worries about Jewish demography should worry about the family. We
cannot afford to draft married women because it will decrease the
birth rate. 11 3 Thus, at the same time that the fledgling Israeli
government made clear its commitment to sex equality by taking the
bold and unique step of conscripting both men and women, it also

106.
Id.
107.
See Defense Service Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 44 (1952) (Isr.); Defense Service
Law, 5738-1978, 32 LSI 221 (1978) (Isr.); Defense Service Law, 5749-1989, LSI 25
(1989) (Isr.).
108.
Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 95.
109.
Defense Service Law, 5709-1949, 3 LSI 112 (1949) (Isr.); Seidman & Nun,
supra note 98, at 99.
110.
Berkovitch, supra note 5, at 610.
111.
Id. Berkovitch also points out that in the years since 1949, this issue has
never been raised in parliament or by the Israeli public. Id. at 611. "It is considered
natural and obvious," she suggests, "and has never attracted the public attention." Id.
112.
Id. at 610 (quoting DK (1949) 1568, 1569).
113.
Id. at 611 (quoting DK (1949) 1627).
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made clear its view that motherhood and the birthing of new citizens
should be the priority for all Israeli women. This exemption from
military service, which has endured since its institution in 1949, is
justified much like the different treatment afforded to women in the
employment laws--allowing them to refuse night work, forcing them
to take a mandatory maternity leave, exempting them from work
dangerous to fertility, and allowing them to retire early. All are
justified by the acknowledgment that women have a role in Israeli
society that is, at times, considered more important than that of a
worker-women are wives and mothers, and their treatment in
Israeli employment law acknowledges both the reality of this
situation and society's reliance on women continuing to fulfill this
role.
6.

Preservation of Privilege

In addition to the specific grants of privilege to Israeli women in
the Women's Employment Law, the Equal Retirement Age Law, and
the Defense Service Law, several statutes contain a statement
confirming the general commitment to special treatment or granting
of privileges to Israeli women. These provisions indicate that such
privilege does not, in the eyes of the law, constitute unlawful
discrimination, a position that enables the accommodation approach.
The Israeli Equal Employment Opportunity law, passed in 1988,
includes such a provision. Among the statements prohibiting
discrimination and sexual harassment and clarifying the rights of
male and female workers, the law also contains a provision called
"Preservation of Privileges."'1 14 The Section states that the law "does
not come to detract from privileges granted to female workers by
legislation, collective bargaining agreements, or employment
contracts and does not view such privileges as discrimination."1' 15
The legislative history surrounding this law makes clear that the
preservation of privilege was essential to the creation of the Israeli
sex equality regime. Ora Namir, Head of the Committee on Labor
and Welfare, presented the bill to the parliament and suggested that
"the basic principle of the law is the creation of equal opportunities in
employment and not equality in conditions alone. '1 16 Moshe Katzav,
Minister of Labor at the time of the law's passage, further highlighted
this provision's importance in Israel's system of asymmetrical
equality:

114.
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, 1988, § 3 - Preservation of Privileges
(author's translation).
115.
Id.
116.
DK (1988) 1984.
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The law allows for the preferential treatment of women workers in
specific instances. [It] recognizes the societal reality of division of roles
between partners in a couple and the placing on the woman, even if she
works outside the home, of the concern for the household and care of
1 7
the children.

The Preservation of Privilege Section of this law was clearly intended
to ensure the legislation's accommodationist approach to sex equality
in employment. As Katzav indicated, the law recognizes the social
reality that Israeli women carry additional burdens at home and thus
allows for special treatment of women at work to compensate for their
unequal social reality.
The Preservation of Privilege provision in the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law of 1988 can be viewed as a broad
statement of Israel's legislative approach to sex equality in
employment: equality for women in employment is the end goal, but
that end should be reached through acknowledgement and
accommodation of women's biological and social differences.
In
granting women the option to refuse night work, instituting
mandatory paid maternity leave, forbidding dangerous work to
pregnant or fertile-age women, granting women the option of early
retirement, and exempting wives and mothers from military service,
the Israeli employment legislation clearly advocates the difference
approach to equality in employment. In contrast to a formal or
Aristotelian notion of equality, Israeli legislation does not aim to
achieve absolute equality but rather grants women special privileges
and exemptions as a means of accommodating their biological and
social differences. The following Parts will address the ways in which
the Israeli courts have dealt with the accommodationist approach of
the legislation and will suggest reasons and circumstances of Israeli
history and society that have created the context for Israel's equality
through difference regime.

IV.

ISRAELI CASE LAW ON SEX EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT

While the primary focus of this Article is the Israeli legislative
approach to sex equality in employment, the case law on the subject,
while not extensive, has certainly served to further women's rights
and positions in the workplace. However, it is difficult to see an
overwhelming trend in the Israeli Supreme Court's approach to sex
equality in employment, both because of the sources upon which it
relies and because of the structure of the judiciary. The Israeli
judicial system is only fifty-seven years old, and thus, it relies on

117.

DK (1988) 1984, 1989.
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precedents and legal theories from numerous countries and
systems. 118 In addition, the court, which is a fourteen member body,
typically sits in three or, in important cases, five judge panels,
allowing for only a few opinions on an issue. 119 The individual judges
each have different approaches to the concept of equality, in
in what Frances Raday refers to as
particular sex equality, resulting
"a mosaic of different opinions." 120
Raday, who has researched extensively the philosophies of
numerous individual justices of the supreme court, suggests that
their approaches to the issue of sex equality range from "a traditional
Aristotelian approach" to a "fully socio-dynamic approach" but that
each judge seems to maintain internal consistency in his or her
views. 121 Regarding the court as a whole, however, she argues that
there has been a clear shift to socio-dynamic--or what this Article
has referred to as difference or accomodationist-equality. 122 While
Raday's study dealt with the broad concept of equality in Israeli law,
her argument holds true with regard to the treatment of sex equality
in employment laws in particular.123

118.
Gary J. Jacobsen, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1763, 1774 (2004).
119.
See Daniel J. Rothstein, Adjudication of Freedom of Expression Cases
Under Israel's Unwritten Constitution, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 279 (1985) (noting
that while the Court typically sits in three judge panels, it can also "sit in panels of odd
numbers over three by order of the President of the Court, the Deputy President, or the
three-judge panel originally assigned to the case"). The court's inconsistency results
both from structural issues and from the court's lack of clarity over whether it is a
constitutional or law-making court or a simple court of appeal.
Any description of the Court's positions must be qualified in light of the Court's
practice of hearing cases in less than full panels .... The difficulty of analyzing
the Court as a body is exacerbated by the judges' tradition, apparently
inherited from England, of publishing separate opinions based on very similar
grounds of decision.
Id. at 261, n.83. See also Courts Law [Consolidated Version], 5744-1984, § 26, 1123
S.H. 198, 202.
120.
Raday, supra note 6, at 448.
121.
Id.
Id. at 448.
122.
123.
It is important to note that there has been much discussion regarding the
impact of the 1992 Basic Law, Human Dignity and Liberty, on the equality
jurisprudence of the court. While the law does not explicitly mention the term
"equality," a number of justices believe that its principles mandate equality and that
the law can be used as a basis for future holdings invalidating discrimination. Raday,
supra note 6, at 382, 418. Israeli law professor Shimon Shetreet describes this law,
along with the Basic Law, Freedom of Occupation, as giving "fundamental rights a
preferred normative status." SHIMON SHETREET, JUSTICE IN ISRAEL: A STUDY OF THE
ISRAELI JUDICIARY 431 (1994). He believes that these two laws "will allow in the future
the invalidation of laws which conflict or contradict them." Id.
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In the 1970s, the equality cases in the Israeli Supreme Court
were clearly decided through a formal equality prism. Justice
Agranat set the tone for these cases in 1971 in Boronovski, where he
laid out the basic Aristotelian formula for equality that has since
124
been cited in virtually every Israeli case dealing with the subject.
In 1976, the court decided its first sex equality in employment case,
Lifshitz-Aviram v. Law Society. 125 The case emerged out of the
Israeli Law Society's rule requiring all new attorneys to perform a
two-year internship (or staj) before they are considered full members
of the profession. 126
The rule contained an exception for those
serving reserve duty in the military. 12 7 Despite the month-long
absence for reserve duty, this time would nevertheless be counted
towards the fulfillment of the internship requirement. 12 8 However,
the same exemption was not applied to women lawyers who became
pregnant during their two-year internships. 12 9 Under the Women's
Employment Law of 1954,130 such a woman was forced to take a
three-month maternity leave, during which time it was a criminal
offense to employ her. Despite the mandatory nature of this leave, it
was not given the same status as reserve duty leave and was not
counted towards the completion of the internship requirement. 131 As
a result, female attorneys who gave birth during their internship
years were forced to work additional time to make up for the
mandatory leave. 13 2 The plaintiff, Pnina Lifshitz-Aviram, claimed
that this difference constituted sex discrimination when compared
133
with the treatment of the male intern serving reserve duty.
The court's response to this argument was short and
wholeheartedly negative. The court considered the case through the
prism of formal equality and compared the two parties at issue: the
military reserve soldier and the pregnant woman.

124.
Raday, supra note 6, at 390 (citing Boronovski v. Chief Rabbinate [1971]
IsrSC 28(1) 7). Boronovski dealt with a claim by a married woman that the Rabbinic
license granting her husband permission to re-marry without her consent to a divorce
was sex discrimination because under the applicable Rabbinic law, his consent would
be required should she seek a divorce. Id. She also claimed that it constituted religious
discrimination as such a rule only applied to Jewish citizens. Id. at 391. The court,
while recognizing the injustice to the woman, refused to overrule the Rabbinic court,
perhaps recognizing the political ramifications such a decision would have. Id. at 390.
Despite the court's failure to find discriminatory treatment, the dictum regarding
formal equality has been cited in many subsequent cases. Id. at 392.
125.
HCJ 335/76 Lifshitz-Aviram v. Law Society [1976] IsrSC 31(1) 250.
126.
Raday, supra note 6, at 393.
127.
Id.
128.
Lifshitz-Aviram, IsrSC 31(1) 250.
129.
Id.
130.
See supra Part III.B.2 for a full explanation of the maternity leave laws.
131.
Lifshitz-Aviram, IsrSC 31(1) 250.
132.
See id.
133.
Id.
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There is no negative discrimination against [the pregnant woman] as
opposed to the Reserve duty person because, as is known, there is no
negative discrimination except in a case in which the qualities are the
same. This is not the case here, because even if you admit that there is
equality from the perspective that the pregnant woman fulfills a
position that should be encouraged from a national standpoint, their
other features are different, and hence, it is not unlawful for the
Bureau to privilege the soldier (male or female) over the pregnant
134
woman.

Thus, despite the fact that the court recognized that both the birthing
mother and the reservist fulfilled functions of national importance,
and despite the fact that the leave taken by each was mandated by
law, the court, with little explanation, found them sufficiently
different to justify differential treatment. Subsequent to this case,
the Law Society voluntarily changed its policy to exempt maternity
leave from the staj requirement just as it did reserve duty. 135 Thus,
while the court in 1976 was operating under a formal equality
scheme, the parliament and administrative agencies had adopted a
more accommodationist approach to women's roles as mothers and
caretakers, an approach that was not only evident in the employment
laws at the time but also in the response of the Law Society to this
supreme court case.
Over a decade later, the court again applied the formal equality
approach to a question of women's rights but emerged with a more
favorable result for the female complainant. In Shakdiel v. Minister
of Religious Affairs, a local government council proposed that a
religiously observant woman be appointed to the religious council for
the area.' 36 The local rabbi opposed her appointment. 137 The woman
was ultimately excluded from the religious council because she was a
woman, because women had never before served on these religious
councils, and because it was argued that her presence would impair
the proper functioning of the council. 138
The woman filed suit
claiming that her gender was an irrelevant ground for
disqualification and that this exclusion constituted unlawful sex
discrimination. 1 39 While this was not an explicitly employment lawrelated case, the ramifications for sex equality in employment were
clear. The case addressed a government agency's right to exclude a
woman from a specific position solely because of her sex.

134.
135.
136.
221,223.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 252.
Raday, supra note 6, at 394.
HCJ 153/87 Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs [1988] IsrSC 42(2)
Id. at 225.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 232-33.
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In a lengthy opinion that discussed the nature of the religious
councils as governmental, administrative bodies and the stance of the
Jewish law (Halachah)regarding a woman's participation in such a
body, Justice Elon held that the woman should be included in the
composition of the religious council and required one of the already
installed male members of the council to vacate his seat in her
favor.140
Justice Elon based this decision on a formal equality
approach to the law. He compared the two groups at issue, men and
women, and finding no relevant difference that would justify different
treatment, mandated equal treatment such that the woman be
appointed to the religious council. 141 Unlike Lifshitz-Aviram, then,
this case demonstrated the court's efforts to grant women equal
rights using the Aristotelian or formal equality approach.
Only two years later, in 1990, in a case dealing directly with
employment law issues, the court began to embrace the
accommodationist or difference approach that had shaped the
142
legislature's actions for decades. In Nevo v. National Labor Court,
the plaintiff, Dr. Naomi Nevo challenged the Jewish Agency's Pension
Rules that mandated women's retirement at age sixty while requiring
men to retire at age sixty-five. 143 Nevo, a sociologist who worked for
the Jewish Agency, originally brought suit in the Regional Labor
Court. 1 44 She claimed that the early retirement aspect of her
collective agreement constituted unlawful sex discrimination and
sought, as a result, to have that provision declared void. 14 5 Both her
actions at the regional level and at the National Labor Court were
dismissed,' 46 and Dr. Nevo then filed an appeal with the supreme
147
court sitting as the High Court of Justice.

140.
Id. at 293.
141.
Id.
142.
Nevo, IsrSC 44(4) at 749.
143.
The Pension Rules constituted a section of the Terms of Employment that
was derived from an agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Central
Committee of the Union of Office Workers in Israel. Id. at 756.
144.
Id. at 751.
145.
See supra note 89.
146.
The National Labor Court, relying on the fact that the Knesset had only
passed laws prohibiting sex discrimination in hiring and in wages, found that it could
not invalidate the different retirement age in the Pension Rules because it was outside
of the intentions of the legislation. Id.
147.
Nevo, IsrSC 44(4) at 751. The Israeli Supreme Court sits both as the
highest court of appeal with discretion to hear appeals from judgments of the district
courts and as the High Court of Justice, which has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with
"matters in which it deems it necessary to grant relief in the interests of justice and
which are not within the jurisdiction of any other court or tribunal." Rothstein, supra
note 119 at 279 n.191 (citing Basic Law of Adjudication,1984, S.H. 78, 80). The
supreme court, when sitting as the High Court of Justice (Bagatz in Hebrew, which is
an acronym meaning High Court of Justice), may review cases on appeal from the
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However, between the dismissal of her case by the National
Labor Court and its review at the supreme court, the Knesset passed
legislation to remedy what was viewed as an unjust verdict at the
National Labor Court. 148 In 1987, the Knesset passed the Equal
Retirement Age for Male and Female Employees Law, requiring
parity of retirement age in collective agreements. 14 9 Where the
agreement had provided for an earlier retirement age for women,
however, the law allowed female workers to retain the right to retire
at that earlier age. 150 This law was passed after Nevo had filed her
petition and applied only prospectively, giving it little if any legal
impact on the case before the supreme court. 151 Thus, the court was
faced with deciding whether the old Pension Rules constituted sex
discrimination and what, if any, weight to give the newly enacted
Knesset law on retirement age.
The court began, as it has begun most cases on equality, by
citing to Boronovski and Justice Agranat's formulation of the
Aristotelian conception of equality: "[I]t is necessary to treat equally
people between whom there are no substantial differences which are
relevant to their object."'152 The court then questioned whether
gender differences justified different retirement ages in light of the
dual purposes behind the mandatory retirement age: (1) enabling the
employee to rest after years of service and (2) allowing the employer
to revitalize his staff with new, young workers. 153 The attorney for
the Jewish Agency argued that the earlier retirement age constituted
a privilege given to women in recognition of their dual roles of worker
and wife/mother and added that many women supported it. 15 4 The
court, in rejecting this argument, noted that when women reach the
age of sixty, they have completed their obligations as mothers, so the
distinctions between men and women are wholly irrelevant at that
155
point.
In addition, the court recognized that there are numerous
"negative personal, mental, and social consequences" to retirement in
that retirees often feel that they are no longer contributing to

National Labor Court on the basis of ultra vires-a substantial legal error or neglect of
the rules of natural justice. See SHETREET, supra note 123, at 99.
148.
See Raday, supra note 32, at 181.
149.
See Equal Retirement Age for Male and Female Employees Law; see also
Raday, supra note 32, at 181.
150.
See Equal Retirement Age for Male and Female Employees Law, supra note
149.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Nevo, IsrSC 44(4) at 771.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 753.
Id.

155.

Id. at 754.
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society. 156 The court also noted that there are negative economic
consequences to early retirement: (1) women who have not amassed
full pension benefits by age sixty lose the ability to accrue more time
and to earn more upon retirement; (2) they lose five years of full
salary, which is worth more than pension payments; and (3) they lose
the ability to advance in careers that required many years of
advanced training and education before joining the workforce. 157 The
court then explicitly stated that early retirement is particularly
harmful to women workers:
Many women cannot devote the bulk of their energies to work during
the period when they are bearing and raising their children. As a
result,
they
lose
many
years
necessary
for
career
advancement.... However, when a woman reaches the age of sixty,
and her children in most cases have already left their parents'
home ... it is precisely at this moment that the woman, if she is
interested, is able to . . . devote more time to work. To force her,
because she is a woman, to retire from her work at this stage of her life
and abandon the realization of her hopes in this area is indeed
15 8
discrimination.

The court concluded that early retirement should not be viewed as a
privilege for women, but that it instead constituted unlawful
discrimination in violation of the principles of the Women's Equal
Rights Law. 159
The court then added a highly significant, although little
emphasized, remark. Justice Bach, who wrote the majority opinion,
stated: "I do not find fault with giving women the option to retire;
this is likely to be to the advantage of all concerned.' 6 0 Finally, the
court made mention of the newly enacted Male and Female Workers
(Equal Retirement Age) Law and held that despite its nonretroactivity, the law did not preclude a finding that the Pension
Rules constituted unlawful discrimination. 16 1 Despite a thorough
treatment of all the issues involved in this case, Justice Bach never
returned to his comment approving of an option for women to retire
any time between ages sixty and sixty-five. In this one exceptionally
important comment, however, the court changed direction from
focusing purely on formal equality to an accommodation approach
that mandated parity but still allowed for some privilege to remain in
the hands of female workers. 162 In so doing, the court essentially

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

161.

Id.

754-55.
756 (emphasis in original).
765-69.
756 (emphasis in original).

162. Interview with Frances Raday, Professor, Hebrew Univ., Faculty of Law, in
Jerusalem, Isr. (May 9, 2004). Professor Raday, who argued this case on behalf of the
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approved of the legislature's initiative in this area which, like many
of its laws, took an "equality through difference" approach to women's
treatment in the workplace.
Roughly five years later, the supreme court was again asked to
evaluate an allegedly discriminatory policy, this time dealing with
the military, and had an opportunity to further develop its
accommodation approach. The case, Miller v. Minister of Defense,
involved the military's ban on female fighter-pilots in the Israeli Air
Force. 16 3 While this case did not explicitly deal with an employment
law or a provision of a collective agreement, the military is widely
recognized as the initial gateway into the labor market. In addition,
Alice Miller, the plaintiff, made clear in her arguments to the court
that it was nearly impossible to become a civilian pilot for an Israeli
airline without first serving as a pilot in the military, making this
164
case particularly relevant to employment law issues.
Alice Miller held a pilot's license in South Africa, from where she
When she reached the point of
had immigrated to Israel. 165
mandatory military service, Miller requested to take the tests to
enter fighter-pilot training but was rejected because, the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) responded, women could not serve in combat
When Miller appealed to the supreme court for an
units. 166
injunction to force the military to allow her to take the tests, the IDF
argued that women were precluded from serving as fighter-pilots
because of statutory provisions that created relevant distinctions
Specifically, the military pointed to
between the genders. 167
provisions mandating shorter periods of service for women, an age
cap for women in the reserves that was lower than that for men, and
the prohibition on mothers serving in the reserves. 168 The IDF
argued that based on these exemptions and prohibitions, women
could not be counted on in the 'critical mass' of pilots needed for the
routine operational plan of the Israeli Air Force" nor would it be
fiscally responsible to invest large sums of money in training women
to be pilots when they could not be relied on to serve for long periods
169
after the training was complete.

plaintiff, has commented that she believed the court wanted her to argue for absolute
formal equality so that it might base its decision on that basis but that it was always
willing to allow for optional earlier retirement as part of its decision.
163.
HCJ 4541/94 Miller v. Minister of Defense, [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 94 (Isr.).
See Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 116; see also Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at
164.
164.
Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 103; see also Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 115.
165.
Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 103-04.
166.
Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 109; see also Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 116.
167.
Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 108-09; see also Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at
168.
116; see supra text accompanying notes 78-86.
Seidman & Nun, supra note 98, at 116-17.
169.
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The case was referred to a five-justice panel because of its
importance and was ultimately decided by a 3-2 majority. 170 Justices
Mazza, Dorner, and Strasberg-Cohen, the majority justices, all
concluded that accommodation was a necessary component of sex
equality law. 17 1 The court began by citing to Justice Agranat's
Aristotelian formula for equality first expounded in the Boronovski
case. 172 It then held that under a formal equality scheme, there were
no relevant differences between men and women to justify this
unequal treatment, and therefore, the exclusion of women from the
pilot's course constituted unlawful sex discrimination. 173 The justices
recognized that the differences that did exist between the sexes
emerged out of statutory provisions that made unequal demands on
men and women. 174 However, the court did not advocate the
equalization of these underlying laws. Justice Mazza found that the
differential treatment in the statutes was "intended to ease women's
lot, obviously so in view of the biological differences between the
sexes" but that there was an obligation to accommodate these
differences and, particularly, an obligation on the state to pay the cost
of this accommodation. 175 Justice Dorner similarly argued:
The interest in guaranteeing the dignity and status of women, on one
hand, and the continuation of society's existence and the rearing of
children, on the other, demands-as far as possible-that women
should not be . . . discriminated against vis-&-vis men. The social
regulations-including the legal regulations-must be adapted to their
needs. 176

Thus, Justices Dorner and Mazza supported the statutory differences
in the Defense Service Law's treatment of men and women, despite
the cost to the Air Force that resulted. In this way, both justices
advocated an explicitly accommodationist approach based primarily
on society's need for women to continue in their roles as mothers.
The third member of the majority, Justice Strasberg-Cohen,
similarly found that there was a relevant difference between the
sexes and that it was created by the various statutory exemptions of
She argued that where those
women from military service.
differences could be "neutralized at a reasonable cost," they should be
accommodated in order to achieve equality. 177 Each of the majority

170.

Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 103.

171.

Id. at 114.

172. Id. at 109.
173.
Id. at 109-11.
174.
Id. at 113.
175.
Raday, supra note 6, at 420 (quoting Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 114).
176.
Raday, supra note 6, at 422-23 (quoting Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 142).
177.
Raday, supra note 6, at 430 (quoting Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 121). Raday
argues that Justice Dorner, while adopting the accomodationist approach, maintained
an element of traditionalism as she argued for the accommodation of women both as
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justices used a formal equality model to invalidate the actual
discriminatory practice but advocated an approach to sex equality
that accommodated differences between the sexes, whether they were
biological or socially created. In this case, the court truly embodied
the legislation's approach to sex equality, which does not permit the
existence of detrimental discrimination against women but allows for
some differential treatment when it is viewed as positively benefiting
women and accommodating their needs as both workers and family
178
care-takers.

V. CONTRASTING ISRAELI AND U.S. APPROACHES TO SEX
EQUALITY IN EMPLOYMENT

The U.S. approach to sex equality has emerged through
legislation, case law, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution and federal statutes. It is a substantial and complex
body of law that cannot be fully addressed in this Article. Rather, the
purpose of this Part is merely to describe briefly the overall U.S.
approach to equality between the sexes, to highlight the differences
between the U.S. and the Israeli systems, and to point out the small
areas of overlap.
The dominant paradigm through which sex discrimination is
analyzed in the United States is the "equality model" in which
"women cannot be treated differently than men, at least not where
women and men are similarly situated."'1 79 This is essentially a
formal equality approach that compares the two parties at issue, in
this case the two sexes, assessing the ways in which they are similar
or different and the relevance of those differences in the case at hand.
This model has both benefits and flaws. The model provides a clear
test for judges who might otherwise be swayed by preconceived
notions and gender biases. On the other hand, "the equality model

child bearers, the biological characteristic, and as childrearers, the socially created
role. Id. at 424. Justice Strasberg-Cohen, she argues, is the only justice who argued for
accommodation solely on the basis of biological difference. Id. However, while Raday
may argue that Strasberg-Cohen's approach is the most progressive, Dorner's approach
most accurately reflects the Israeli legislative approach which, while accommodating
for reproductive differences, also accommodates for women's social role as wives and
mothers. Id.
The concept of affirmative action for women in employment laws or in any
178.
sector of society is beyond the scope of this Article, as it involves differential treatment
as a means of remedying historical discrimination rather than as an attempt to
accommodate present day biological and social differences. Israeli legislation and case
law, however, do discuss the concept of affirmative action as is evident in the Israeli
Supreme Court case, HCJ 453/94 Isr. Women's Network v. Minister of Transp. [1994]
IsrSC 48(5) 501.
Burns, supra note 9, at 278.
179.
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has been limited in its ability to address underlying patterns of
inequality.' ' 8 0 This approach to sex equality emerged out of the
model used to address racism and race discrimination in the United
States, where it was clear that any biological difference should play
no role in assessing the treatment of a racial group. As a result, the
use of this model in combating sex discrimination has, at times,
ignored real differences between men and women "given that women
Both legislation and Supreme
bear children and men do not."''
Court jurisprudence have, in recent years, acknowledged the problem
of reproductive difference to some extent, but the dominant approach
to sex equality has remained the formal equality approach with a
recognition that some alteration must be made to deal with the
82
impact of historic discrimination and with biological differences.'
This formal equality model was not always the dominant
approach to the position of women in the United States. The laws
and cases of the late nineteenth century and the early part of the
twentieth century consistently maintained that women deserved both
protection and special treatment.18 3 In one of the most famous cases
of the early twentieth century, Lochner v. New York, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that labor could be regulated based on the
need to protect an individual's right to contract.' 8 4 At the same time,
numerous states passed laws regulating the number of hours women
could work, prohibiting women from working at night, and setting a
minimum wage for female workers.' 8 5 When this issue reached the
Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon in 1908, the Court upheld

180.
Id. at 279.
181.
Id. at 278.
182.
One of the dominant influences on the development of the U.S. approach to
sex equality is the economic and political model in which the United States operates.
"[Tihe United States economy is a private market economy in which issues of public
health and welfare, such as healthcare and childcare, have been part of that private,
not public attention." Id. at 276. In contrast to the political systems of Israel and
much of Western Europe which emerged out of socialist influences, the United States'
capitalist approach means that areas in which men and women operate differently,
particularly child birth and childcare, have been viewed as outside the purview of
government intervention so that "the family has been treated from the public-sector
perspective as a private personal concern, not a matter for the national public agenda."
Id. As a result, U.S. law prohibits sex discrimination but does not affirmatively step in
to alleviate burdens that widen the gap between men's and women's ability to
participate in public life.
See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
183.
184.
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (invalidating a New York state
law that limited the hours that bakers could work to ten per day on the grounds that it
constituted "an illegal interference with the rights of individuals to make contracts").
185.

See Alice Kessler-Harris, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING

WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, 183-87 (1982) for further discussion of the
development of such protective legislation and the motivations and justifications
behind it.
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Oregon's protective legislation for the female worker on the grounds
that "her physical structure and a proper discharge of her maternal
functions ... justify legislation to protect her from the greed as well
as the passion of man. 18 6
The U.S. approach has undergone a drastic transformation in the
last fifty years so that unlike the Israeli system, which maintains
some special treatment legislation, protective legislation for women is
no longer legal in the United States. Rather, under the formal
equality model created by the legislation and case law of the 1960s
and 1970s, policies that favor or provide special treatment to women
187
constitute sex discrimination just like policies that favor men.
With the emergence of the civil rights movement and the advent of
anti-discrimination law, special treatment was dismissed as a form of
discrimination that both perpetuated stereotypes of the sexes and
hindered women's ability to participate in all aspects of public and
private life. 188
The history of legal remedies for sex discrimination in the United
States began in the 1960s. The Equal Pay Act, which prohibited sex
discrimination in employee wages, was passed in 1963.189 Emerging
out of the formal equality model, the statute essentially required
courts to inquire whether the disparity in pay between a man and a
woman resulted from sheer discrimination or whether there was a
legitimate explanation for the difference. 190 This statute was later
eclipsed by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which combats
discrimination in public accommodation facilities, education, federal
programs, employment, and voting. 191 Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act specifically addresses employment, prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 192 The Act
includes an exception to the above prohibition for religion, sex, and
national origin for what has come to be referred to as a "BFOQ" or

186.
Muller, 208 U.S. at 422.
187.
See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited:
Evaluating Their Effectiveness in Advancing ProtectionAgainst Sex Discrimination,36
RUTGERS L.J. 1201 (discussing the basic statutory structure of "formal equality
models").
Burns, supra note 9, at 275-78.
188.
189.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963).
For a more elaborate discussion of this statute, see B.A. BABCOCK ET AL.,
190.
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES (1975).
See HOPE LANDRINE AND ELIZABETH A. KLONOFF, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST
191.
WOMEN: PREVALENCE, CONSEQUENCES, AND REMEDIES 177 (1997).

192.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964). It is a widely told story that "sex" was added
to Title VII by Southern Democrats who sought to destroy the legislation and believed
that the addition of "sex" would be so outrageous as to ensure that the bill would not
pass. Instead, Title VII passed with the prohibition on sex discrimination and became,
arguably, the most important tool in the fight for sex equality in the United States.
See LANDRINE & KLONOFF, supra note 191, at 177.
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"bona-fide occupational qualification" that is "reasonably necessary to
193
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."'
The courts have interpreted Title VII to cover both disparate
treatment discrimination, where an employer's policy facially
discriminates against women, and disparate impact discrimination,
where a "policy that appears to be sex-neutral" in practice has
discriminatory results. 194 Despite this flexibility in interpretation of
what constitutes discrimination, Title VII maintains a formal
equality model, allowing for differential treatment only where there
is a difference between the sexes that is relevant to the particular
employment situation. Thus, the primary means of achieving sex
equality in the United States is through the removal of obstacles to
opportunity, in particular through the prohibition of discrimination.
This attempt to eliminate discrimination as a means of achieving
sex equality is common to both Israel and the United States.
However, it is in the treatment of biological and socially created
differences between the sexes that the laws of each country diverge.
This is particularly evident in the interface between pregnancy,
childrearing, and work. The U.S. Supreme Court initially dealt with
reproductive differences in Geduldig v. Aiello, in which the plaintiffs
challenged a state disability insurance plan that, despite covering a
comprehensive list of disabilities, excluded pregnancy. 195 Geduldig
was followed two years later by General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, in
which female employees sued under Title VII because they had been
denied disability benefits while absent from work as a result of
pregnancy. 196 In both cases, the court employed a formal equality
analysis and compared two categories of workers: pregnant women
and non-pregnant persons of both sexes. Despite the fact that only
women become pregnant, the Supreme Court held that discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy did not constitute unlawful sex
discrimination because there were female workers in both
categories. 197 The Court's formal equality analysis resulted in this
strange conclusion. As a result, Congress responded in 1978 with the
passage of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) as an
198
amendment to Title VII, explicitly overruling the Gilbert decision.
The PDA specifically provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related

193.
194.
195.
196.
at 293.
197.
198.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
LANDRINE & KLONOFF, supra note 191, at 178.
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see also Burns, supra note 9,
Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 134.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
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medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes .. .as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work ...199

The PDA requires the courts to view differential treatment on the
basis of pregnancy as a form of sex discrimination.
More recent case law interpreting Title VII and the PDA has
created a mixed set of precedents that, for the most part, maintain
formal equality with a glimpse of accommodationist leanings. In the
first case, California Federal Savings and Loan v. Guerra, the
Supreme Court upheld a state law that required four months of
unpaid maternity leave against a challenge that the law violated the
PDA, which required absolute equality between pregnancy and other
disabilities. 200 The Court in Guerra took its most accommodationist
approach yet, choosing to view the PDA as a floor and not a ceiling,
pregnancy as a means of
and allowed for preferential treatment of
20 1
women.
for
opportunities
equal
achieving
Only four years later, however, the Court seemed to take an
entirely contradictory approach in U.S. Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, in which it struck down, under Title VII, an
employer fetal protection policy that prohibited women of fertile age
from working in a workplace that had large amounts of lead
"Decisions about the
The Court famously stated:
exposure. 20 2
welfare of future children [must] be left to the parents who conceive,
bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire
those parents or the courts." 20 3 The Court in Johnson Controls
prohibited differential treatment of pregnancy when the result was to
exclude women from employment based on their ability to have
children.2 0 4 Thus, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on pregnancy
and work depicts a somewhat inconsistent path that seeks primarily
to maintain formal equality between the sexes while permitting some
differential treatment when it benefits women.
The most recent addition to legislation regarding work and
pregnancy came with the passage of the Family Medical Leave Act
(FMLA).20 5 The statute requires employers with more than fifty
employees to allow workers to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid
leave to care for a new infant or an ill family member, while

199.
200.
201.
202.
comparison
policies.
203.
204.
205.

Id.
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
Id. at 285.
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187. See supra note 82 for an explicit
of this case to the Israeli legislation instituting similar fetal protection
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 188-89.
Id. at 206.
Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1999).
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maintaining the right to be restored to the same or an equivalent
position when they return to work. 20 6 The statute's language is
intentionally gender neutral, allowing both male and female workers
to take advantage of this leave. However, its unpaid nature makes it
difficult for those with little savings or lower incomes to make use of
the time off. There has been much debate surrounding the
effectiveness of the FMLA, and numerous studies have assessed its
use by each gender. 20 7 Despite the controversy and criticism, the
FMLA is still valid and has not been modified or supplanted since its
original passage in 1993.
In comparing the Israeli and U.S. approaches to sex equality in
employment, a number of differences are immediately clear. While
the Israeli approach allows affirmative government involvement in
the regulation and protection of women workers, the U.S. approach
focuses almost exclusively on prohibiting discrimination as a means
of achieving equality. Additionally, while Israeli legislation maintains
some special treatment of women to alleviate the burden of being
both workers and family care-takers, U.S. legislation mandates
gender neutral approaches to the family-work dilemma in an effort to
maintain the formal equality model. What is not immediately clear,
however, is which system is more successful in achieving sex equality
in employment and to what extent success is based on the unique
needs of each individual society. To better understand both the
impact and the emergence of an equality scheme, Part VI will
examine the factors in Israeli history, society, and law that created
the equality through difference approach.

VI. SOCIAL, HISTORICAL, AND STRUCTURAL UNDERPINNINGS

OF ISRAEL'S EQUALITY THROUGH DIFFERENCE MODEL

The use of a particular model or theory of equality is dependent
in large part on the dominant values and priorities of the society in
which it is used. The notion of equality is itself a social product,
constructed out of already existing ideologies, practices, and
structures. The laws and legal theories that enforce a notion of
equality tend to both reflect these already existing social norms and
reproduce them. The notion of formal equality, which treats like
individuals alike, is attractive to U.S. society, a capitalist economy in
which the focal point is the individual person and his or her ability to

206.
Id. § 2612.
207.
For additional discussion and assessment of the FMLA, see Samuel
Issacharoff and Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the
Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1994); see also Michael Selmi, Family
Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707 (2000).
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succeed. Thus, in arguing for equal treatment of a specific group in
the United States, it is beneficial to focus on the ways in which
individual members of that discriminated against group are identical
to members of a group who are treated with dignity and respect.
In contrast, capitalism and individual rights have not been of
primary importance in Israeli society. Instead, in Israel the equality
through difference model arose out of and tends to reproduce
numerous social realities, including: Israel's strong familial tradition,
the republican or collectivist ideology that dominates Israeli society
and politics, a demographic crisis and the resulting emphasis on
motherhood, the impact of Jewish law and its maintenance of sex
segregated spheres, and the influence of western European policy
approaches to family and work. These factors are societal goals,
social norms, and political realities, and they create the context in
Israel in which the accommodationist approach to sex equality
thrives.
A. Israel's Collectivist Ideology
In their recent book, BEING ISRAELI, two prominent Israeli
sociologists, Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, argue that there are
three primary political discourses that frame Israeli society and law:
the republican discourse, the liberal discourse, and the ethnonationalist discourse. 20 8 They define the liberal discourse as one in
which the role of politics is to "protect individuals from interference
by governments, and by one another, in the exercise of the rights they
inalienably possess. '20 9 The republican discourse, on the other
extreme, is one in which members of the community "experience their
citizenship . . . as active participation in the pursuit of a common
good" and in which greater obligations to society "are accompanied by
exceptional privileges. ' '210 Finally, the ethno-nationalist discourse
suggests that common descent is a pre-requisite for full citizenship
with no obligation to contribute to the state beyond embodying this
211
identity.
Shafir and Peled argue that the ethno-nationalist and liberal
discourses are currently engaged in competition for supremacy in

208.
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 41, at 3. Shafir and Peled have alternately
referred to these discourses as "citizenship discourses," which they define as "political
and linguistic strategies of membership fashioned out of alternative combinations of
identities and claims." Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, Citizenship and Stratification
in an Ethnic Democracy, 21 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUD. 408, 409 (1998).

These

discourses serve to stratify society and determine validity of claims to rights and
privileges of membership in the community. Id.
209.
SHAFIR & PELED, supranote 41, at 4.
210.
Id. at 5.
211.
Id. at 6.
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Israeli society.2 12 However, they maintain that the country was born
out of the republican or collectivist ideology, in which, unlike the
liberal discourse, the focus is not on the individual and his rights but
rather on the community's needs and goals and the ways in which
individuals can contribute to this community. 213 This ideology was a
product of the Labor Settlement Movement of the early 1900s, which
created Jewish settlements in British-controlled Palestine. 214 The
ethos of the early Jewish settlers was chalutziyut, or pioneering.
They were committed to the Jewish people and to redeeming their
land, a philosophy which Peled has argued was distinctly republican
in its approach: "Like most nationalist ideologies, it embodied a
defined
collective
sense
of
mission
for
an
ethnically
community ....
While individual rights and the procedural rules of
democracy were widely respected, they were clearly seen, in line with
republican thinking, as secondary in value to the collective Zionist
215
mission."
The republican ideology remained dominant in Israel even as the
country transitioned from early settlements to a nation-state. In fact,
Shafir and Peled argue that a new republican virtue "was invoked to

212.
Id. at 21. Shafir and Peled argue that liberalism and ethno-nationalism
are on the rise in Israel and that as a result, the republican discourse will decline in
importance. Id. However, this argument in BEING ISRAELI was published before the
current intifada (the second) and recent war in Lebanon emerged as dominant and
defining factors in Israeli society. It could be argued that the state of conflict and
renewed terrorism have caused a resurgence of the republican discourse, to which
people tend to cling when under threat. A renewed devotion to the state and the
community over the needs of the individual is a natural response to threats from the
outside. Thus, the theory proposed by Shafir and Peled is useful for purposes of this
Article in understanding the origins of the ideologies operative in Israel but may not
provide an accurate picture of current and future developments. Additionally, Yoav
Peled, in a 1992 article that appears to be a precursor to his recent book, argued that
"the dominant strain in Israel's political culture may be termed ethno-republicanism.
Yoav Peled, Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Constructionof Citizenship:Arab Citizens
of the Jewish State, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 432 (1992). "Jewish ethnicity is a
necessary condition for membership in the political community, while the contribution
to the process of Jewish national redemption is a measure of one's civic virtue." Id. at
435. This argument is still convincing, especially in light of the recent intifada and its
impact on society. Similarly, Dafna Izraeli argued that women's demand for equality
was undergoing a strengthening as a result of a decline in the collectivist approach. In
an article published in 1993, she wrote: "Looking to the 1990's, it appears that when
the Intifada ends and the economy begins to revitalize, the issue of women's
entitlement to more equal rewards for their investments in human capital and for their
potential contributions to economic life will have greater probability of moving closer to
center stage." Dafna Izraeli, Women and Work: From Collective to Career, in CALLING
THE EQUALITY BLUFF: WOMEN IN ISRAEL, supra note 32, at 165, 176. While Izraeli may
be correct that women's demands and rhetoric will change with the liberalization of
Israeli society, the projected end to the intifada has yet to materialize.
213.
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 41, at 17.
214.
Id.
215.
Peled, supra note 212, at 434.
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legitimate the transition to statehood. '216 As an example of this
rhetoric, they cite to the words of David Ben-Gurion, Israel's first
prime minister: "Even if in their private lives they act as chalutzim,
both the individual, and the organizations of individuals, will fail if
they do not put their chalutzic activity in the service of the
state .... 217 Thus, "individuals and social groups continued to be
treated by the state in accordance with their presumed contributions
2 18
to the common good as defined by the Zionist project.1
Ben Gurion even invoked this value of contribution when
considering the creation of a constitution for the new state. In
opposing a U.S. style bill of rights as unnecessary, Ben Gurion argued
that citizens' rights would not be endangered by their democratically
elected government. 2 19 Instead, he advocated for the creation of a
"bill of duties" because the new country could not, he believed, be
built or defended "without intensified chalutziyut, and chalutziyut
'220
means accepting the burden of duties.
This discourse of duty and contribution was so dominant that it
became, in addition to the rhetoric used to encourage communal
participation in statehood, the language used by women to legitimate
their fight for the right to participate in the labor market. These
women framed their argument "in terms of their right to contribute to
the creation of the new society. The rhetoric of motives was couched
in collective not individualistic terms: It was an ideology not of
personal entitlements but of social obligations. . . . After statehood,
this collectivistic ideology translated into public policy." 221 Thus, the
republican discourse served both to transition the community from
settlement to statehood and provided a rhetoric through which groups
advocated their own advancement.
This notion of attaining status, rights, and privileges in society
on the basis of one's contribution to the collective is alive and well in
present day Israel. It is embodied in the policy of mandatory military
service, as a result of which former soldiers receive benefits that are
widely presumed to be a right of those who have served the larger
community.2 22
Additionally, it is evident in the language of

216.
Shafir & Peled, supra note 208, at 416.
217.
Peled, supra note 212, at 434-35.
218.
Shafir & Peled, supra note 208, at 417.
219.
SHAFIR & PELED, supra note 41, at 261.
220.
Id. at 261 (citing DK (1950) 819).
221.
See lzraeli, supranote 212, at 165.
222.
An example of this was evident on an Israeli news broadcast examining the
government's policy of funding in-vitro fertilization. When the government began to
consider cutting back to funding only two fertilizations per family, some Israelis were
outraged and expressed the belief that because they had served the nation in the
military and continued to serve through the yearly reserve duty, they were owed this
benefit from the government. See, e.g., Moshe Sherer, National Service in Israel:
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politicians, supreme court justices, and average Israelis who often
speak of the needs of the collective as the driving force for individual
and communal action. The dominance of the republican discourse
emerges clearly in the description of Israeli society given by Shulamit
Aloni, a member of the Israeli Knesset. In an interview in 1979,
Aloni tellingly remarked:
[T]here was always talk of the society, to sacrifice for the State, to
sacrifice for the society, which means that the person, the individual, is
less important, and the mission of the people is more important. And
that's why basic rights, which you take for granted in America, we
223
didn't know.

Similarly, Judith Buber-Agassi, an Israeli sociologist and political
scientist, expressed this sentiment, even while arguing for greater
individual rights and liberties. She commented that in her view,
freedom of expression, movement, and thought for individuals is of
the utmost importance in a "decent society. '2 2 4 She hastened to add,
"[b]ecause only the individual who has those rights will be one who
will be ready to contribute to society. '225 Finally, Justice Dorner of
the Israeli Supreme Court seemed to be echoing this view in her 1995
opinion in Miller. In the midst of arguing for greater opportunities
for women, she remarked that this need for sex equality was, in fact,
a societal need lest "the potential of half the population not be
realized, thus harming society as a whole. '226 The discourse of
collectivism is therefore both a foundation of Israel's society and a
dominant contemporary commitment.
The collectivism discourse also has a tremendous impact on the
opportunities available to Israeli women and on the way in which
society conceives of women's proper role.
The emphasis on
collectivism translates, with respect to women, into an emphasis on
family and traditional female roles within the family, because that
conception is ultimately good for the society and the state. This
conception of Israeli women began pre-statehood when the republican
discourse dominated the early settlement movement. As Shafir and
Peled argue, "the Zionist version of republican discourse-physical
labor, agricultural settlement, and military service-were all
conceived of as essentially masculine," leading to an emphasis on

Motivations, Volunteer Characteristics, and Levels of Content, 33 NONPROFIT &
VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 94 (2004) (discussing motivations behind military service in
Israel).
223.
GERALDINE STERN, ISRAELI WOMEN SPEAK OUT 20 (1979).
224.
Id. at 93.
225.
Id. (emphasis added).
226.
Miller, IsrSC 49(4) at 142, cited in Raday, supra note 6, at 423 (emphasis
added).

20071

PRIVILEGED BUT EQOUAL?

women's private familial roles as their form of republican
227
contribution.
Despite this emphasis on traditional familial roles, however, the
early state laws, such as the Women's Rights Law of 1951 and the
Women's Employment Law of 1954, did recognize that women could
also contribute to society as workers. These laws, however,
maintained a dual focus. They were "founded on a combination of the
socialist philosophy that everyone should be engaged in productive
labor and the social commitment to development of family, in which
women were perceived as playing the role of homemaker." 228 The
conception of women's roles and choices was therefore dictated in
large part by the emphasis on their contribution to society. Women
would be encouraged not as individuals with the right to labor
participation, but as elements in a collective whose role was created
by the needs of the community.
In sum, the dominance of the republican discourse in Israel has
meant a focus not on individual rights but instead on how each
individual can best contribute to society. Within this paradigm,
women are often viewed in their traditional familial roles because as
wives and mothers, they can offer an essential contribution to the
needs of the collective-the next generation. 229 Through law and
rhetoric, Israeli society has, of course, also acknowledged women's
contribution as workers. However, because the focus is not on what
women as human beings deserve in terms of the right to work and
instead emerges out of a collectivist discourse focusing on communal
contribution, the conception of equality must fit that collectivist
ideology. Rather than seeking to achieve absolute or formal equality
of rights, the collectivist approach seeks equality of contribution to
society at large. Accommodation or equality through difference is
acceptable in Israeli society in large part because collectivism allows
room for difference as long as the contribution and resulting social
status is equal. Thus, while the commitment to achieving equality is
paramount, the conception of what equality means is a product of the
dominant republican discourse.
B. The Demographic Threat and Resulting Importance of Motherhood
Within the collectivist focus of Israeli society, the contribution of
women as mothers has often been elevated in value above all else.
This has resulted, in large part, from the demographic crisis in which
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Israel sees itself, a crisis which has emphasized women's reproductive
capacity as a national asset. This discussion of the demographic
threat and the importance of motherhood must begin by noting the
overall emphasis in Israeli society on "familism" and the importance
of the family.
The strong familial tradition in Israel, it has been argued, is tied
in large part to the influence of the Jewish religion and the large
religious population on the politics, laws, and overall culture of the
society. Israel, when it was first established in 1948, was born of a
coalition between secular Zionists who sought to create an ethnically
Jewish nation-state and religious Zionists who believed that Israel
was their religious homeland. 230 Calling this an "unholy coalition,"
Judith Buber-Agassi explained that the two sides, in order to work
together, sought common ground and found it in their parallel
emphasis on traditional family values:
[I]n order to somehow gloss over this unholy coalition ..
the elements
in the secular Zionist ideology were emphasized, which we, more or
less, have in common with Orthodoxy. And that is an emphasis on the
family. "Familism," I would call it, is the all importance of the family
and the emphasis on having larger families .... And this familism has
encouraged the view that the proper place of women is first and
231
foremost in the home as wives and mothers.

Thus, the initial focus on the family and women's traditional family
roles emerged with the birth of the state and was a function of the
necessary political coalition between the religious and secular parties.
Evidence of the importance of women's familial roles can also be
found by examining the development of the women's movement in
Israel. Israeli women themselves, in seeking equality, greater
political representation, and legal rights, have often defined
themselves first as mothers and focused almost exclusively on their
rights and needs in that familial role. 2 32 In the pre-state settlement
movement, women pioneers had already begun to organize
themselves around women's issues. In 1911, these settlers formed
the Women Worker's Movement, dedicated to the "struggle for equal
participation of women in pioneering activities. '233 Only twenty
years later, however, the organization changed its name to
"Organization of Working Mothers" to better capture its focus and
membership. 234 Thus, despite the fact that this organization was

230.
Justice Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court has stated: "In my
opinion, Zionism on the one hand and Jewish halachah on the other hand left their
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232.
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essentially a labor union, its focus, since 1930, has been to advocate
23 5
for greater assistance for working mothers.
Similarly, the 1970s women's movement that emerged in Israel
had a uniquely familist focus (as opposed to its U.S. counterpart that
focused on equal rights in education, work, and government). The
women's party platform in Israel during this time called for pension
rights for housewives, for housework to be counted as work
experience, and for the creation of community centers in which the
work of running a home, including laundry, cooking, and child care,
could be communalized. 236 In addition, the women's litigation of the
time reflects a similar familist focus. Lifshitz-Aviram, a 1976 case,
was the first case in which the supreme court was asked to address
the problems of sex equality in employment, and it arose in the
context of the needs of working mothers. 237 As discussed above, the
plaintiff in Lifshitz-Aviram, a female attorney, sought to force the Bar
Association to reduce her required two-year internship period by
three-months, the period of her mandatory maternity leave. 23 8 While
the plaintiff lost her case, the mere fact that the first equal
employment case raised at the supreme court involved the treatment
of mothers suggests that the emphasis on familial roles even served
to define the movement for women's equality.
This focus on familism and motherhood, while present on its own
in Israeli society, has been reinforced by the ever-present
demographic threat. This threat emerged at the time of the first
settlements in the pre-state period and continues today. 239 It is the
notion that Israel is engaged in a demographic battle with its Arab
neighbors and the non-Jewish residents of its own territory such that
increasing the population through reproduction and immigration is of
utmost importance. The fear is that, should Israel lose this battle, it
would mean the end of the Jewish state altogether. As a result of this
fear, "giving birth in Israel may take on the proportions of a political
act."24 0
The notion of a demographic crisis in Israel emerged in the prestate settlement period. Jewish settlers were overwhelmingly in the
minority in their new homeland, and they recognized that increasing

235.
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the Jewish population was essential to the goal of making Palestine a
permanent home. 24 1 To this end, they continually encouraged
Jewish
African
and
North
European
from
immigration
communities.2 42 However, the British government, then in control of
Palestine, in an effort to staunch the growing power of Jewish
settlers, instituted restrictions on Jewish immigration. 243 As a result,
the settlers began to refer to reproduction as "internal
immigration."2 44 Reproduction, outside of the control of the British,
and thereby
population
was viewed as a means of increasing the 24
5
serving the community's most essential need.
The reliance on reproduction to combat the demographic crisis
continued as the population transitioned from pioneering settlers to
citizens of the newly formed state. Israel's first prime minister,
David Ben-Gurion, stressed this point in numerous speeches and
comments, always emphasizing the importance of women's
reproductive contributions. 246 Shortly after statehood, the Israeli
Knesset debated and enacted the Defense Service Law of 1949 which,
among other things, mandated military service for men and women
but exempted married women and mothers from that obligation.
Ben-Gurion, in defending that position, remarked in the course of the
legislative debate that "[m]otherhood is the unique destiny of women
2 47
and there is no destiny that is more important than motherhood.
Similarly, a Knesset member from the ruling Labor party seconded
this notion in an even more explicit endorsement of the prioritization
of motherhood: "He who worries about Jewish demography should
worry about the family. We cannot afford to draft married women
because it will decrease the birthrate." 248 In 1967, Ben-Gurion, then
an elder statesman, spoke out again in an article in the Ha-aretz
newspaper: "Increasing the Jewish birthrate is a vital need for the
existence of Israel, and a Jewish woman who does not bring at least
2 49
four children into the world ... is defrauding the Jewish mission."
Thus, the early Israeli leaders endorsed and reinforced the
importance of women's contributions as mothers, framing this as both
their paramount role in society and as the fulfillment of a vital social
and political need.

See STERN, supra note 223, at 63.
241.
Id.
242.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
Id.
245.
Berkovitch, supra note 5, at 610.
246.
Id. (citing DK (1949) 1568).
247.
Id.
248.
249.
How Can the Birthrate be Increased?, HA'ARETZ MAG., Dec. 8, 1967, quoted
in HAZLETON, supra note 239, at 63.

2007]

PRIVILEGED BUT EOUAL?

As a result, the government instituted policies and programs to
encourage women to take on this role. The government created cash
prizes for women with ten or more children, creating financial
250
incentives to make motherhood one's primary or exclusive focus.
Additionally, the government instituted, and still continues to issue
through the National Insurance Fund, birth allowances and
payments for each additional child, subsidizing child rearing and thus
making the creation of large families a more viable option
financially. 25 1 Finally, the government made Mother's Day a legal
work holiday for women with children, further emphasizing the
25 2
importance of that role.
While the demographic threat initially emerged as a result of the
Jewish settlers' position as a minority within the territory of Israel
itself, the continual wars between Israel and its neighbors further
reinforced the feeling of crisis. One Israeli sociologist noted with
respect to the 1973 war, in which all of Israel's Arab neighbors
attacked jointly: "The Egyptians alone outnumber Israeli Jews by ten
to one, and anyone who witnessed the human wall assaults of
Egyptian troops across the Suez Canal . . . knows the importance of
population for Israel's survival. '253 With the rise of terrorism
directed at military and civilian targets, the crisis has only
intensified. Lest one think that because Israel is nearing its sixtieth
birthday this demographic threat has declined, Ha'aretznewspaper in
2004 published an article entitled "The Demographics Point to a
Binational State," in which the author argued that given current
population trends, Israel could not maintain its Jewish character
much longer:
At the end of the War of Independence, after the expulsion and flight of
some 700,000 Arabs, the population of Israel consisted of eighty-two
percent Jews and eighteen percent Arabs. In 2003, fifty-four years and
almost three million immigrants later, the Central Bureau of Statistics'
official figures indicated a similar Jewish-Arab ratio (eighty-one
percent

Jews,

nineteen

percent

Arabs).

.

.

. If

we

assume

that ...massive immigration is no longer very likely, it becomes clear
why more and more demographic experts and Jewish politicians see the
254
question of a "Jewish majority" in Israel as a central issue.

250.
See Marilyn Safir, Religion, Tradition, and Public Policy Give Family First
Priority,in CALLING THE EQUALITY BLUFF, supra note 32, at 57, 59; see also HAZLETON,
supra note 239, at 71. While this government initiative emerged in the 1950s, it was
quietly abolished in 1959 when the government realized that Arab families were
benefiting far more under the program than Jewish Israelis. Id.
251.
See Safir, supra note 250, at 59.
252.
Id.
253.

HAZLETON, supra note 239, at 69.

254.
Yair Sheleg, The DemographicsPoint to a Binational State, HA'ARETZ MAG.,
May 25, 2004, at 6.
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In discussing potential means of combating this crisis, the author
pointed to immigration, mortality, and the birth rate. 255 However,
immigration, he noted, is unlikely to be large enough to truly make a
difference, shifting the focus entirely to the birth rate.2 56
In
comparing Israel's birth rate to other countries with similar gross
domestic product (GDP) figures, Israeli professor Sergio Della Pergola
found that "the fertility level of Israel's Jews, a population with an
average per capita GDP of $17,000, exists elsewhere in the world only
in countries with an annual average per capita GDP of $3200 (like
Albania and Uzbekistan). 257 Similarly, the birthrate of Israel's
Muslim population mirrors that of countries like Kenya and Sudan,
which have far lower GDPs. 258 Thus, Della Pergola has concluded
that the cause of the unusually high fertility levels in both
populations must be attributed to "the national conflict, which pushes
both groups to increase birth rates. ' 259 The demographic threat has
continually been and still is a dominant concern of the Israeli Jewish
population and its representatives. The result has often been to focus
on women's capacity for reproduction, or "internal immigration," and
the need to incentivize reproduction and value motherhood as "a
'260
national mission.
In a society dominated by a republican ideology that values
contribution over individual rights, and in a context of continual war
with far more populous enemies, women gained status in large part
through their ability to reproduce.
This approach "presents
reproduction as women's incomparable and unique contribution as
citizens of their state, and as their prime channel for fulfillment as
human beings."' 26 1 This view, which prioritizes motherhood above
other roles for women, gains some expression in the contemporary
women's employment laws as well. If the collectivist ideology deems
equal ability to contribute to be more important than individual
rights, and the demographic threat makes reproduction of paramount
importance to society, it seems only natural that employment laws
would reflect the society's desire to allow women equal opportunities
to succeed in the workplace while also encouraging service to the
state through motherhood. The mandatory maternity leave policy,
the option to refuse night work for family reasons, the exemption of
mothers from military service, and the exclusion of fertile women
from certain industries are all policies that seek to accommodate

255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Berkovitch, supra note 5, at 606.

261.

HAZLETON, supra note 239, at 27.
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women's familial role while insuring them a place in the workforce. A
formal equality regime, which would reject such special treatment,
would also likely fail to encourage motherhood. Thus, in large part it
is the combination of the republican ideology and the demographic
threat that make accommodation rather than formal equality an
appropriate paradigm for Israeli sex equality law.
C. Impact of Jewish Law and Its Exemption of Women from Ritual
Obligation
While the republican ideology and demographic threat may
explain Israel's adoption of an accommodationist approach to sex
equality in employment, further explanation may be found in the
principles of Jewish law, which, as the cultural and religious
inheritance of the state of Israel, have arguably influenced its civil
legal system as well. Under Jewish law, women are exempted from
many ritual obligations, a principle that is often explained by
262
reference to women's more important roles as wives and mothers.
This exemption and its explanations encourage sex-segregated roles
to benefit the community, an approach that to some extent mirrors
the Israeli legislative approach to equal employment law. Jewish law
is one of the most fundamental cultural influences on Israeli society
and its legal system. "It constitutes a moral system whose values and
attitudes penetrate the consciousness of every Israeli, man and
woman, religious and non-religious." 263 As a result, the tradition
embodied in Jewish law may further explain the evolution and
acceptance of accommodation and equality through difference in
Israel's equal employment laws.
Traditional Jewish law, or halachah, presents a complicated and
264
sometimes inconsistent approach to women and ritual obligations.
The overwhelming principle, despite some exceptions, is that women

262.
Id.
263.
Id. at 52-53.
Halachah is an elaborate system that includes the Torah (the Jewish
264.
Bible), oral law, and various interpretations of and commentaries on these two
elements. The traditional view is that Moses received the written law, the Torah, from
God on Mt. Sinai approximately 3,200 years ago. Stephen J. Werber, Cloning: A Jewish
Law Perspective With a Comparative Study of Other Abrahamic Traditions, 30 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1114, 1122 (2000). This was then complemented with an oral law, the
Mishnah, that was redacted by R. Judah Ha-Nasi, in 200 C.E. Id. Rabbinic
commentators further explained both the written and oral law in a book called
Gemara. Id. While these three sources are seen as foundational and unchanging, they
are subject to ongoing interpretation in the form of "(1) judicial decision making; (2)
rabbinic response to specific questions-'Responsa'; (3) commentary by... scholars ...
and (4) Midrash." Id. at 1122-23.

406

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 40..337

are exempt from "positive time-bound commandments. '26 5 This
means that a ritual obligation that is to be performed at a specific
time is mandated for men only. Such obligations include: the
recitation of the Shema prayer,2 66 the wearing of phylacteries or
tefillin, and the dwelling in the sukkah,2 67 among others.2 68 While
there are numerous time-bound commandments that women are
obligated to do, these instances are primarily viewed as exceptions
that do not defeat the principle itself. 269 The time-bound ritual
obligations constitute many of the central ritual acts of daily Jewish
life, a reality that has led to frustration among many women who
seek to be full participants in their religion.
Nonetheless, explanations and justifications for this exemption
abound, both from ancient and modern Rabbinic commentators.
While the explanations express different understandings of the role
and character of women, virtually all of them note that this
exemption is not meant to create inequality between the sexes nor to
imply women are of a lesser status-"both [men and women] are
In fact, some commentators explain the
equally sacred. '2 70
exemption by citing to women's superiority, as did the Maharal of

265.
See MOSHE MEISELMAN, JEWISH WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 43-50 (1978); see
also Mishnah Kiddushin, 1:7 ("And all positive time-bound commandments men are
obligated in and women are exempt from, and all positive non-time bound
commandments both men and women are obligated in."). There are two types of
commandments in Jewish law: positive ("thou shall") and negative ("thou shall not").
While it is understood that women are obligated in all negative commandments, this
source in the Mishnah indicates that women are exempt from some positive
commandments. See RACHEL BIALE, WOMEN AND JEWISH LAW 10-15 (1984).
266.
The Shema is the prayer recited four times daily: morning, midday,
evening, and at night.
267.
The sukkah is the hut in which Jews dwell during the holiday of Sukkot.
268.
MEISELMAN, supra note 265, at 44-45.
269.
For example, women are obligated in the prayer after meals, birkat
hamazon, despite the fact that it is a positive time-bound commandment (in that it
must be done after eating). See Mishnah Brachot, 3:3. There is a great deal of debate
around the question of whether a woman is permitted to perform the ritual acts from
which she is exempted. Under Jewish law, performing an act out of obligation is
rewarded more than performing an act voluntarily. See MEISELMAN, supra note 265, at
48. As such, some commentators allow women to perform these acts while others
preclude them. See id. Additionally, Rabbis differ over whether a woman may say the
appropriate blessing when performing this ritual act. See id. The formulation of
Jewish blessings is: "Blessed are You, 0 Lord, our God, King of the universe, who has
sanctified us through his mitzvoth, and commanded us to .... " See id. As a result,
some argue that women, who are not technically commanded to perform the ritual,
may not say these words while others maintain that the phrase refers to the collective
obligation of the Jewish people, thereby permitting women to say the blessing as well.
See id.; see also Maimonides, Laws of Tzitzit 3:9; Tosafot, Commentary on Kiddushin
31a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayyim 589:6.
270.
MEISELMAN, supra note 265, at 43. While those who oppose the exemption
of women view this type of statement as merely apologist, such explanations appear
time and again in the opinions that discuss the subject.
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Prague, a sixteenth century Jewish jurist who explained that women
have greater potential for spiritual growth and thus do not need the
ritual obligations men do. 271 Numerous others, however, suggest that
this exemption was based on women's obligations to the home and
family. Abudarham, a fourteenth century commentator, suggested
that because women's familial obligations are so important, they
should not be forced to choose between the performance of these and
the performance of ritual obligations. 272 Similarly, Saul Berman, a
modern commentator, suggests that women are exempted from
obligations that would mandate "a communal appearance" because "it
was the mandatory departure from the home which would constitute
the greatest threat to the proper performance of household
responsibilities. '273 Finally, Menachem Brayer, a commentator in the
1980s, argues that it is the specific emphasis on the Jewish woman's
maternal role that provides the reason for the exemption:
This assertion that the Torah views the role of wife-mother as the
proper role for a Jewish woman cannot be denied. There are countless
rabbinic passages to substantiate such an assertion. The Torah went
out of its way to protect this role by exempting the woman from any
religious demands which might possibly conflict with the proper
fulfillment of this wife-mother role. The reason . . .is obvious. The
very survival of the Jewish people, the preservation and the
transmittance of our heritage, depend on the selection of just such a
274
role by Jewish women.

Thus, one of the primary explanations for a woman's exemption
under Jewish law from many ritual obligations is the focus on and
importance of her role as mother and homemaker, a role which, as
noted above, is vital to the survival of the Jewish people.
The similarities between this traditional Jewish legal approach
and that of the Israeli legislation are self-evident. In each, women

MENACHEM BRAYER, THE JEWISH WOMAN IN RABBINIC LITERATURE - A
271.
PSYCHOHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 150 (1986). Other similar explanations include Rabbi
Samson Raphael Hirsch's position that women "have greater fervor and more faithful
enthusiasm for their God-serving calling." MEISELMAN, supra note 265, at 44. These
explanations are immediately suspicious, of course, as numerous legal scholars have
noted that whenever women are lauded as special, it is often an excuse to exclude them
As Justice Brennan noted in Frontiero v. Richardson, sex
from something.
discrimination has often been "rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism,'
which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
272.
See MEISELMAN, supra note 265, at 43; see also Sefer Abudarham, Part IV,
Birchat Hamitzvot, translated in BIALE, supra note 265, at 13.
273.
Saul Berman, The Status of Women in Hallakhic Judaism, TRADITION
MAG., 1973, at 16.
BRAYER, supra note 271, at 205. This passage in particular is remarkably
274.
similar to remarks by David Ben-Gurion and other government officials explaining
women's exemption from the military and the importance of motherhood to the Israeli
national endeavor. See also supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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are exempted from certain activities-under Jewish law, ritual acts,
and under Israeli law, military service, employment after childbirth,
night work, and work in industries dangerous to fertility. In each
case, these exemptions are justified by the overwhelming importance
of women's familial roles and obligations and the community's need
for continual reproduction.
Because this approach to women's participation in ritual practice
is a fundamental component of Jewish law, it is not a radical jump to
assume that the presence of this concept somehow influenced Israeli
law as well. While Jewish law is certainly not cited as a source of the
accommodationist provisions of the employment laws, 275 numerous
legal scholars have argued that the principles of Jewish law act as a
moral and cultural basis for much of the Israeli legal system. The
Foundations of Law Act of 1980 explicitly made this reliance a lawful
endeavor, stating: "If the court, in considering a legal question
requiring determination, finds no answer to it in any enactment, in
decided law or by way of analogy, it shall determine the question in
the light of the principles of liberty, justice, equity and peace in the
Jewish heritage. '276 With this act, the parliament formally endorsed
the use of Jewish law to aid in making secular legal decisions.
In addition to this codification of the role of Jewish law,
halachah has an informal impact on Israeli legislation and court
decisions as well. As Justice Menachem Elon, former President of the
Israeli Supreme Court, wrote: "In some measure, the law in the State
of Israel follows the principles of Jewish law even in areas where the
277
latter system has not officially been rendered applicable."
Similarly, Israeli legal scholars note that while Jewish law has not
been affected by Israeli law, "[t]here is, however, little doubt that to a
certain extent, Israeli law is influenced by Jewish law. ' 278 Finally,
Jewish law has clearly had an impact on the decisions of the supreme
court, particularly when the court must decide what justice or public

275.
legislation,
Severance
Menachem

Jewish law is a cited source of law for numerous pieces of Israeli
including: the Cooperative Houses Law, the Wage Protection Law, the
Pay Law, the Maintenance Law, and the Laws of Succession.
See
Elon, The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law and its Application in the

State of Israel - Part IV,4 ISR. L. REV. 80, 84-85 (1969); see also THE PRINCIPLES OF
JEWISH LAW 42 (1975).

276.

Foundations of Law Act, 1980, translated in JEWISH LAW AND CURRENT

LEGAL PROBLEMS 9 (1984).

277. THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW, supra note 276, at 42. Similarly, Israeli
legal scholar Shmuel Shilo echoed these comments, noting "Jewish law has had its
impact-if not too strong a one-on the Israeli legal system both in the field of
legislation and in the decisions of the courts-especially Israel's Supreme Court."
Shmuel Shilo, Jewish Law in the Israeli Legal System, in TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN
IUS COMMUNE 81, 84 (1999).

278.

Brayahu

Lifshitz,

Israeli Law and Jewish Law -

Independence, 24 ISR. L. REV. 507, 507 (1990).
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policy entail. Justice Silberg spoke of the influence of Jewish law in
Zim v. Maziar,279 commenting: "[Flor determining what would our
public policy be and require ...we look to our own moral and cultural
values, as indeed we have no other source of good order and public
policy. ' 280 It is evident that Israeli society and, by extension, Israeli
law draw on the cultural and religious heritage provided by Jewish
law.
The notion of exempting women from various aspects of public
life has existed in Jewish law since its creation, and both ancient and
modern commentators have explained this exemption as a means of
alleviating the burden on a woman whose primary obligation is to her
home and family. While there is certainly no direct connection
between this concept in Jewish law and the various exemptions
provided to women under Israeli civil law, the similarity is
remarkable. Given that judges, politicians, and scholars agree that
Jewish law influences Israeli society in countless subconscious ways,
it is reasonable to conclude that the existence of these exemptions in
Jewish law served to prime the Israeli public for the use of similar
exemptions and protections in equal employment law. The notion of
an exemption for women because of a higher or more fundamental
obligation thus pervades both religious law and secular employment
law in Israel, making the equality through difference approach
palatable and welcomed by both lawmakers and workers.
D. European Countries'Approachto Family and Work
While it is the Author's position that the equality through
difference approach is acceptable in Israel because of related social
factors including the collectivist ideology, the emphasis on
motherhood, the demographic threat, and the influence of Jewish law,
it is important to note that Israel is not alone in its adoption of the
accommodationist approach to sex equality in employment. Israel's
conception of sex equality differs greatly from that of the United
States, but its model is remarkably similar to that of numerous
European countries. This model may be acceptable to the Israeli
public because of the social factors described above, but its creation
was probably influenced to some extent by these European welfare
states.
European countries are, in general, committed to the principal of
equal opportunity and equal treatment for both sexes. However,

279.
C.A. 461/62, Zim v. Maziar (1963) IsrSC 17.
Haim H. Cohn, Jewish Law in Israel, in JEWISH LAW IN LEGAL HISTORY
280.
AND THE MODERN WORLD 124, 139 (Bernard S. Jackson ed., 1980) (quoting Zim, IsrSC
17. at 1330 ff.).
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unlike the United States, which has rejected protective legislation
because of this commitment to equal treatment, the European Union
has indicated an acceptance of some protectivist or special treatment
policies for women.28 1 Like Israel, the European Union mandates sex
equality but considers exemptions and special treatment relating to
motherhood to be outside of the equal treatment mandate. 28 2 While
this principle manifests differently in the various E.U. Member
States, some examples include the exclusion of pregnant women from
work that would endanger the fetus or the mother and bans on night
work for pregnant and nursing women.2 8 3 Israel similarly has fetal
protection legislation banning fertile age women from work in
dangerous industries and a legal provision guaranteeing women the
right to refuse night work because of family reasons.28 4 These
policies exhibit an approach to equal employment law that
accommodates difference when motherhood is a factor.
Nowhere is this special treatment for motherhood model more
evident than in maternity leave policies in both Israel and the
European Union. In 1996, the European Union passed a directive
that applies to all of the Member Countries. The Directive indicated
that workers were to have "individual entitlement to parental leave
on the grounds of the birth or adoption of a child, enabling them to
take care of the child for at least three months.''28 5 The individual
Member States must implement this directive and can introduce even
28 6
more favorable policies than that guaranteed by the E.U. directive.
European countries offer extremely generous paid leave programs
explicitly for mothers to cover the weeks and months after childbirth.
Most of these countries also supplement maternity leave programs
with parental leave that provides both mothers and fathers with paid
leave during their children's pre-school years. 28 7 Specifically, the
Nordic countries, including Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and
Norway, 288 offer between thirty and forty-two weeks of paid

281.

Helen Fenwick, Special Protectionsfor Women in European Union Law, in

SEX EQUALITY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 63, 73 (1996).

The E.U. Commission has

indicated "a rejection of the notion of protection for women in general but an
acceptance of a protective stance towards maternity: the construct-protection for
womankind-becomes protection for motherhood." Id.
282.
Id.
283.
Id.
284.
See supraPart III.B. 1.
285.
Directive on Parental Leave and Leave for Family Reasons:
Council
Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 (quoted in JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS,
FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 310

(2003)).
286.
287.

Id.
GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 284, at 121.

288.
While Norway is not a member of the European Union, it is, as a result of
international agreements, bound by the gender equality provisions of E.U. law. See
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maternity leave. 289 Other European countries, including Belgium,
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, offer twelve to
sixteen weeks of paid maternity leave. 290 In contrast, the only
similar national program in the United States is the Family Medical
Leave Act, which guarantees male and female workers up to twelve
2 91
weeks of unpaid leave to deal with a variety of family concerns.
Thus, the Israeli approach of mandatory paid maternity leave more
closely resembles that of the various European countries, which
provide paid leave specifically for mothers post-childbirth.
In addition, Israeli law bears some resemblance to the European
laws' endorsement of special treatment for women workers. For
example, Norway, which has a basic act mandating sex equality in
work, private life, and public administration, also includes a provision
in this legislation for special or differential treatment. The Act states
that, "differential treatment of men and women may be in accordance
with the law if the treatment can promote gender equality in
accordance with the objective of the Act. '292 This provision allows for
the creation of certain advantages for one sex over the other with the
understanding that such special treatment may, in actuality, promote
overall equality. This approach, like what is here called equality
through difference or accommodation, in Israeli law suggests that
equality is not necessarily achieved through absolute sameness in
treatment and allows for exemptions and special privileges to further
the goal of equality. Thus, while it emerged out of numerous social
factors, ideologies, and political realities, Israeli law may have been
influenced by the family-work policies and sex equality regimes of
European countries, which share Israel's socialist history and modern
welfare state model.

VII. CONCLUSION

Israeli equal employment law seeks to create equal opportunity
for male and female workers within the realities of Israeli society. To
that end, the law takes an accommodation approach, eschewing
formal equality for a system that allows differential treatment of

Anne Lise Ryel, The Nordic Model of Gender Equality Law, in SEX EQUALITY LAW IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 281, at 357. The other Nordic countries mentioned
are all E.U. members.
289.
GORNICK & MEYERS, supra note 285, at 122.
290.
Id. at 123. For a chart of the specifics of each country's leave policy, see id.
at 124-27.
291.

29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1).

292.

Ryel, supra note 288, at 362.
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Despite pronouncements of equality and equal
female workers.
treatment, the law allows only women to refuse to work at night due
to family reasons and prevents discrimination against those workers
who exercise this right. The law prohibits female workers of fertile
age from working in industries that may be dangerous to their
fertility. It exempts women who are married or are mothers from
military service, the gateway to the Israeli workplace, and allows
women workers to retire earlier than their male counterparts.
Finally, it mandates a maternity leave of three months with parental
leave for fathers provided only as a supplement to this maternal
preference. These privileges, exemptions, and options are provided
solely to women and yet are provided as part of an equality-seeking
regime and explained in each case as a means of achieving greater
equality for women workers who bear the burdens of both work and
family obligations.
It is clear that the Israeli system does not condone differential
treatment of women workers as a means of rejecting the principle and
value of sex equality. Rather, the Israeli system views this approach
as essential to achieving equality. And yet the U.S. system, similarly
committed to achieving sex equality in the workplace, operates in an
entirely different framework, that of formal equality. U.S. legislation
and case law maintain that equality demands absolutely equal
treatment, that sameness of treatment will lead to actual equality in
practice, and that differential treatment can only lead to damaging
stereotypes in which women will be viewed as less valuable workers.
Why the difference between the two nations? The Author has
argued that the Israeli system, while no less committed to equality,
operates under the equality through difference approach because of
ideological underpinnings, political and demographic needs, and
cultural influences. The draftsmen of Israel's Succession Law, which
deals with issues of inheritance, similarly indicated that in creating
that law in 1952, they relied on:
(1) the legal and factual situation that exists at present in this country
(2) Jewish law which is one of our national cultural possessions and
which we must revive and continue; [and]
(3) the laws of other countries in the West and East from which our
people have been gathered in order to mingle here as a unified
community.

293

The same considerations, the Author has argued, are true for the
series of laws dealing with equal employment for Israeli women. The
laws emerged out of the legal and factual situation of the country in

293.

Menachem Elon, The Sources and Nature of Jewish Law and its

Application in the State of Israel- PartIV, 4 ISR. L. REV. 80, 81 (1969).
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that the collectivist history and ideology, as well the demographic
needs and resulting emphasis on women's reproductive contribution,
have greatly impacted the conception of equality that is operative in
these laws. The Jewish law as a national cultural possession and its
notion of exempting women from ritual obligations has
subconsciously influenced Israeli employment law. Finally, the laws
of European countries, which have similar welfare state mentalities,
have clearly influenced the Israeli system of employment laws as
well.
The remaining question, however, is how to evaluate the Israeli
approach to sex equality. U.S. observers may consider the Israeli
approach simply that of a society not yet ready for true equality.
Such is the instinct of one Israeli woman, who, commenting on what
has come to be known as the "myth of equality," took this exact
position in an article in a daily newspaper in 1986:
What gets me is the deception: Israeli society is still not ready for
equality and women's liberation, because all of us are still chained to
our traditional roles .... So let them stop trying to sell young girls the
beautiful myth of the liberated Israeli woman; it's worth no more than
2 94
the photograph of the woman soldier on the magazine cover.

On the other hand, both Frances Raday and the late Dafna Izraeli,
scholars of Israeli sex equality law, have both justified and praised
the Israeli approach. Izraeli justified the maintenance of privileges
for women by suggesting that it indicated "an ambivalence about
foregoing privileges when the opportunities are not in fact yet
equal. '29 5 Differential treatment is necessary, she argued, until the
society has truly equalized in practice. 296 Frances Raday, in an essay
she wrote in 1995, similarly argued that the options, privileges, and
exemptions for women in Israeli employment law were part of a
process of transition to true equality.
[T]he change from restrictive protections to options has societal justice
to it. The transition from inequality to equality does not happen
overnight. For women who have worked and maintained their family
roles within traditional stereotypes, the change to equality can be a
harsh blow. Many women carry a double burden of household and
workplace work and cannot change this aspect of their lives so late in
the game. The options that are now built into the employment law

294.
Aviram Golan (Barbara Swirski, trans.), Musings of an Israeli Superwoman
in CALLING THE EQUALITY BLUFF, supra note 32, at 101 (adapted from an article that
appeared in Davar (Hebrew Daily) on Nov. 28, 1986).
295.
Dafna Izraeli, Women and Work: From Collective to Career, in CALLING THE
EQUALITY BLUFF: WOMEN IN ISRAEL, supra note 32, at 175.

296.

Id.
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should be seen as "means of transition" that will disappear naturally if
29 7
equality in the workplace is created in practice.

Raday has more recently justified the equality through difference
approach in a new way. She now views it as a more effective and
realistic approach to achieving equality. 298 Raday has argued that a
new, more complex notion of equality must incorporate more than the
removal of discriminatory barriers and must do more than grant
formal equality.2 99 It must also incorporate "an appreciation of group
differences ... which may impede access to social institutions ... and
[must] require measures of accommodation. To meet this new
awareness, the concept of equality has developed into a socio-dynamic
concept that includes equality of opportunity, affirmative action, and
'30 0
accommodation requirements.
U.S. scholars have also recognized the difficulty with a formal
equality regime that ignores the reality of difference. They also note
the problems of an accommodation regime that reproduces negative
stereotypes and may impair the achievement of meaningful equality.
Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor commented on
this dilemma as faced by the Court:
It is in recognizing and responding to this fundamental difference that
our Court has had its most difficult challenges. The dilemma is this: if
society does not recognize the fact that only women can bear children,
then "equal treatment" ends up being unequal. On the other hand, if
society recognizes pregnancy as requiring special solicitude, it is a
slippery slope back to the "protectionist" legislation that barred women
301
from the workplace.

Thus, despite the different approaches actually adopted by the U.S.
and Israeli systems, the problem remains the same. The United
States chose to adopt formal equality and avoid the "slippery slope,"
while Israel chose to accommodate the reality of difference and risk
reinforcement of damaging stereotypes. Neither system, obviously, is
without flaw.
The recognition and examination of these variant approaches to
sex equality in employment leaves numerous questions unanswered.
Can one evaluate a system of equality outside of the context of the
society in which it operates? Are there natural rights that must be
protected, or is the success of a conception of equality dependant on
the specific goals of the society? Who should the equality regime

297. Frances Raday, Women in the Workplace, in THE POSITION OF WOMEN IN
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protect-the majority who may prefer privileges and accommodation
of difference or the minority who do not experience the difference but
only the discrimination? 30 2 Finally, can systems of equality be
transported across countries and cultures-are there aspects of the
Israeli system that would benefit the United States or vice versa?
These questions are left to further research. What is abundantly
clear, however, is that these dilemmas can no longer be ignored in a
society in which many women feel they are failing at combining work
and family. In the United States in the last several years alone, at
least six books have been published from scholarly and popular
authors attempting to explain and provide solutions to the problems
inherent in combining work and family within a culture that requires
a near impossible commitment to both. 30 3 Judith Warner, author of
the most recent of these books, PERFECT MADNESS: MOTHERHOOD IN
THE AGE OF ANXIETY, has noted that as mothers, many women must
choose between their professional careers at the cost of abandoning
their children and a total devotion to home and family at the cost of
living in a state of "crazy-making isolation. ''30 4 But, she adds, "[t]hese
are choices that don't feel like choices at all. These are the harsh
realities of family life in a culture that has no structures in place to
allow women-and men-to balance work and child rearing. '30 5 To
combat this harsh reality, Warner suggests that women stop blaming
themselves and look to their government and society for answers.
"We need solutions-politically palatable, economically feasible,
home-grown American solutions-that can, collectively give mothers
and families a break. '30 6 This Article should serve somewhat as a
response to Warner in that it suggests that those in the United States
must, in fact, look beyond U.S. solutions and recognize that the
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United States is not the only society dealing with these problems.
This Article examined Israeli employment law, its conception of sex
equality, the means to achieve it, and the underlying social realities
that make the definition and approach workable in that nation. The
next step is to identify the social and political realities at work in U.S.
society and to borrow, change, and create solutions that will
ultimately work in this country.

